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ABSTRACT 
This research encompasses three related papers to address some of the influencing 
factors in structural and pricing decisions in supply chains with manufacturing and 
remanufactunng We consider new and remanufactured products that are vertically 
differentiated, that is, the consumers perceive the remanufactured product as of a lower 
quality and thus they are not willing to pay for them as much as they would for the new 
product Examples of such products are seen in computer systems, automotive parts and 
office equipment 
In the first paper, we consider a closed loop supply chain that includes a manufacturer, 
a remanufacturer and a retailer We investigate the pricing decisions for the new and 
remanufactured products under different coordination structures between members of the 
chain while taking into account the consumers' perception of the remanufactured product 
versus new and the quality of returns as two major parameters In addition, we find which 
coordination structure is a better option for the closed loop supply chain members 
Particularly, we find that although a lower price is charged for the new product when the 
retailer and the remanufacturer are coordinated (RREMC) compared to the completely 
decentralized (CD) structure, a higher number of new products are sold in the completely 
decentralized structure A similar result is found for the remanufactured product when 
comparing the CD structure with the one in which the retailer and manufacturer are 
coordinated (MRC) We also find that MRC results in the highest total profit while 
RREMC results in the lowest 
In the second paper, we analyze the pricing decisions for a firm that produces both 
new and remanufactured products and also collects the used product returns (known as 
cores, which are used in remanufactunng) The firm needs to define the core acquisition 
price as well as the selling prices for both new and remanufactured products In our 
models, we capture the quality of returns (by assuming a stochastic collection yield rate) 
and the competition between new and remanufactured products, and show how they 
influence the optimal expected prices and profit of the firm We provide managerial 
insight on how varying the optimal prices could help the firm optimally accommodate for 
different conditions (1 e with respect to changes in the consumers' perceptions of the 
products, the yield rate, and the salvage value of the cores) For example, we find that 
when the firm sells low margin products, a small change in the consumers' perception of 
the remanufactured products versus new could increase the firm's expected profit by 
more than 10% 
Finally, in the third paper, we consider two core collection structures for a firm that 
produces both new and remanufactured products In the first structure (known as the 
centralized channel), the firm collects the cores directly from the consumers, while in the 
second structure (known as the decentralized channel), the firm uses a third-party 
collector to take care of the core acquisition We assume that the demands for new and 
remanufactured products are influenced by the product prices and also by a stochastic 
component We jointly find the optimal prices and lot sizes for each product and 
investigate the impact of the competition between products (1 e consumers' perception of 
the remanufactured product versus new), the quality of returns (1 e the collection yield 
IV 
rate) and the demand uncertainties on the optimal solution in each channel Furthermore, 
we compare the channels on the amount of change in their optimal values and expected 
profits with respect to changes in the parameters We also provide managerial insight on 
how the firm should change the optimal prices and lot sizes in each channel considering 
possible changes in the consumers' perception of the products, the collection yield rate 
and the demand uncertainties For example, we find that when the demand uncertainties 
for the new and remanufactured products are higher, the reduction in the firm's profit is 
about 2-3% less in the centralized channel compared to the decentralized one 
v 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Remanufactunng is the process of bringing a used product to like-new condition 
through replacing and rebuilding component parts (Haynsworth and Lyons, 1987) The 
remanufactured products are usually attractive to the consumers that are interested in the 
brand, but are not willing to pay a price as high as the one for the new products 
Remanufactunng is considered as one of the common processes in Closed-Loop Supply 
Chain (CLSC) management, while the others are product acquisition, reverse logistics, 
testing, sorting and disposition, and distribution and marketing (Guide and Van 
Wassenhove, 2003) CLSC management is defined as the design, control and operation of 
a system to maximize value creation over the entire life-cycle of a product with dynamic 
recovery of value from different types and volumes of returns over time (Guide and Van 
Wassenhove, 2009) A CLSC consists of forward and reverse supply chains and, as a 
result, owns a higher complexity than the more traditional (forward only) supply chains 
Remanufactunng has received a growing attention in practice and also in academia in 
recent years Companies may have several drivers for supporting remanufactunng and 
being involved in a CLSC In some industries, government legislations require the 
manufacturers to take responsibility for the take-back of their end-of-use/end-of-hfe 
products (also known as core acquisition) Some examples of such legislations are the 
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) and the End-of-Life Vehicle 
(EOLV) directives set by the European Union Although WEEE and EOLV directives do 
not impose remanufactunng, the companies may obtain further benefits when extracting 
additional values from the collected cores through remanufactunng In addition, from a 
strategic marketing perspective, remanufactunng practices send a message to consumers 
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that the firm is more environmentally responsible and, consequently, create a competitive 
advantage when dealing with the increasing number of more environmentally conscious 
consumers As a result, some companies get involved in recovery processes to use them 
as a marketing lever As Lebreton (2007) mentions, Fujitsu-Siemens Computers and the 
BMW Group run their own recovery centers in Paderborn and Munich respectively, 
however, these centers are too small to impact on a firm's operating results and exist 
mostly for marketing reasons and to underline the environmental goodwill of these 
companies 
Furthermore, remanufactunng, on its own, can be a profitable business Some 
manufacturers of complex products have set up reverse supply chains and successfully 
recovered value from their returned products The recovery activities of copier (Oce, 
Xerox), electrical equipment (OMRON, see Kuik et al 2005) or tire manufacturers 
(Michehn) are closely linked to their forward supply chain and are of crucial importance 
for their operating profits (Lebreton, 2007) This type of activity can also be seen in the 
automotive parts industry companies like Fenco and Cardone produce both new and 
remanufactured automotive parts It has been reported that the cost of remanufactunng is 
typically 40-60% of the cost of manufacturing a new product with only 20% of the effort 
(Dowlatshahi 2000, Mitra 2007) In the U S , there are over 70,000 remanufactunng firms 
with total sales of $53 billion (USD) (Guide and Van Wassenhove 2001) 
We can classify the CLSCs with remanufactunng into different groups based on three 
different factors first, the product's life-cycle (1 e long life-cycle versus short), second, 
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the type of returns (1 e end of use/life versus warranty returns or any other type of 
returns), and third, distinguishable versus indistinguishable new and remanufactured 
products Our focus in this research is on the CLSCs with long life-cycle products (such 
as automotive parts, office equipment, etc) that collect end of use/life returns to use in 
remanufactunng In these CLSCs, distinguishable new and remanufactured products are 
produced Based on our observations in the automotive parts industry, the new and 
remanufactured products could be produced by separate firms (e g Hitachi that produces 
new products and Champion that produces remanufactured products) or by the same firm 
(e g Fenco and Cardone who produce both new and remanufactured products) The 
former is captured in our first research paper (1 e in chapter 3) and the latter in the second 
and third research papers (1 e chapters 4 and 5 respectively) Making structural and 
pricing decisions is an important part of managing these CLSCs In this context, the 
pricing problem is that of determining the right prices for the new and remanufactured 
products as well as the core acquisition prices that companies might need to pay to the 
consumers We consider new and remanufactured products as two different product types 
although there is no difference between them in terms of the product features and 
functionality Thus, poor pricing strategies will result in capturing less total CLSC profits 
and also in distorting the market for at least one of the product types, either new or 
remanufactured Structural decisions can include finding the optimal coordination 
structure between CLSC members or determining the best core acquisition channel 
There are several factors to be considered when setting prices in a CLSC with 
remanufactunng The knowledge about the consumers' demand and their behavior - how 
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much they are willing to pay for each product type and under what circumstances they 
agree to return the products - is perhaps the most important factor in defining the prices 
for the end products and the core acquisition In addition, a good estimate of all effective 
cost parameters that determine the cost of the goods sold, the relationship between CLSC 
members, the level of information sharing and coordination, and the CLSC structures are 
some of the other key factors Our research addresses many of these factors in structural 
and pricing decisions in three related research papers as follows 
I) In the first paper, our research is motivated by real-life applications where the 
product life-cycle is long enough that the new and remanufactured products coexist in the 
market Examples of such products are automotive parts, mainframe computer systems 
and office equipment (Ferrer, 1997, Ayres et al 1997, Ferrer and Swaminathan, 2010) 
We consider a CLSC in which a retail store sells both new and remanufactured (also 
known as rebuilt) products We concentrate our analyses for cases with two versions of a 
single product (I e new and remanufactured), taking into account scenarios in which the 
manufacturer and the remanufacturer are two separate firms We also consider a supplier 
who provides both the manufacturer and the remanufacturer with new parts By 
definition, the supplier is a member of the CLSC, however, in order to streamline our 
analysis, in this paper, we separate the supplier from the rest of the CLSC members This 
assumption implies that the supplier does not have much of an impact on decisions made 
by the CLSC members However, from a supply chain management point of view, we are 
also interested in investigating the impact of the decisions made by CLSC members on 
higher tier suppliers Having this supplier, as a representative for all second tier suppliers, 
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helps us capture the impact of decisions made by CLSC members on the supplier side 
Note that there are also cases in which the manufacturer takes care of the 
remanufacturing as well We address such cases in the second and third papers in our 
research 
More specifically, in this paper, we find the optimal prices for new and 
remanufactured products made by the wholesalers (1 e , the manufacturer and the 
remanufacturer) and by the retailer In addition, we investigate the pricing decisions 
under different CLSC decision-making structures, defined by different coordination 
scenarios between members That is, we consider a completely decentralized (CD) 
channel, a channel where the retailer and manufacturer are coordinated (MRC), and a 
channel in which the retailer and the remanufacturer are coordinated (RREMC) 
Concurrently, we examine the impact of the quality of returns and the consumers' 
perception of the remanufactured product versus the new on the optimal profits In our 
models, we capture the competition between the manufacturer and the remanufacturer as 
two separate entities as well as the competition (substitution) between new and 
remanufactured products at the retailer Our aim is to answer the following research 
questions 
• How do the optimal prices and quantities compare with each other under different 
CLSC coordination structures7 
• What is the impact of the quality of returns on the optimal CLSC profits9 
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• What is the impact of the consumers' perception of the remanufactured products 
versus the new products on the optimal CLSC profits? 
• What CLSC coordination structure is preferred by the CLSC members under each 
level of quality of returns and consumers' perception7 
II) In the second paper, our research is again motivated by real-life applications where 
the product life-cycle is long enough that the new and remanufactured products coexist in 
the market As mentioned before, examples of such products are automotive parts, 
mainframe computer systems and office equipment (Ferrer, 1997, Ayres et al 1997, 
Ferrer and Swaminathan, 2010) We analyze the pricing decisions for a firm that collects 
the end of life/use product returns (known as cores) from consumers, and uses them in 
remanufactunng, while she manufactures a new product as well The firm needs to define 
the optimal core acquisition price and the selling prices for the new and remanufactured 
products at the same time 
The existing academic literature has defined the acquisition price and the selling prices 
for the remanufactured products from a remanufacturer's perspective (see for example 
Guide et al , 2003, Bakal and Akcali, 2006, and Karakayah et a l , 2007), but they have 
not considered the impact of having the new product in the market and its competition 
(substitution) with the remanufactured product on the optimal prices for the new and 
remanufactured products and the core acquisition We show how the expected optimal 
prices and the firm's expected profit change when there is a competition between new 
and remanufactured products We capture the competition between new and 
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remanufactured products by the relative willingness to pay of the consumers for the 
remanufactured product versus the new This shows the consumers' perception of the 
remanufactured product versus new We model the quality of returns by assuming a 
stochastic core acquisition yield rate, while we take into account two cases of high and 
low profit margin products We analyze how the firm optimally changes the prices when 
the quality of returns and its level of uncertainty vary, and also when the salvage value of 
the collected cores changes We compare the optimal changes that the firm makes to the 
prices and quantities across high and low margin cases with respect to the model 
parameters In addition, we investigate how the firm's expected profit changes (in both 
cases of high and low margin products) with respect to the model parameters In 
summary, we aim to address the following research questions 
• What is the impact of the competition between new and remanufactured products 
on the expected optimal prices and quantities (for the new and remanufactured 
products and the core acquisition) for high and low margin products7 
• What is the impact of the competition between new and remanufactured products 
on the firm's expected profit for high and low margin products7 
• What is the impact of the core acquisition yield rate and its uncertainty on the 
expected optimal prices and quantities for high and low margin products9 
• What is the impact of the core acquisition yield rate and its uncertainty on the 
firm's expected profit for high and low margin products7 
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Ill) Finally, in the third paper, we consider two core collection structures for a firm 
that produces both new and remanufactured products In the first structure (known as the 
centralized channel) the firm collects the cores directly from the consumers, but in the 
second structure (known as the decentralized channel), the firm uses a third-party 
collector to take care of the core acquisition Considering centralized and decentralized 
collection channels has been addressed by some authors in the literature However, to our 
knowledge, we are the first to jointly determine the optimal prices and lot sizes for 
differentiated new and remanufactured products under different reverse channel choices 
We assume that the demands for new and remanufactured products are influenced by the 
product prices and also by a stochastic component Furthermore, we jointly find the 
optimal prices and lot sizes for each product in a single-period setting and investigate the 
impact of the competition between products (1 e consumers' perception of the 
remanufactured product versus new), the quality of returns (1 e the collection yield rate) 
and the demand uncertainties on the optimal solution in each channel Furthermore, we 
compare the channels on the amount of change in their optimal values and expected 
profits with respect to changes in the parameters above We also provide managerial 
insight on how the firm should change the optimal prices and lot sizes in each channel 
considering possible changes in the consumers' perception of the products, the collection 
yield rate and the demand uncertainties In summary, we aim to answer the following 
research questions 
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• What is the impact of the competition between new and remanufactured products 
and the collection yield rate on the optimal prices and lot sizes of the new and 
remanufactured products7 
• What is the impact of the competition between new and remanufactured products 
and the collection yield rate on the optimal core acquisition price and quantity in 
each channel and which channel leads to a higher number of cores to be collected7 
• What is the impact of the competition between new and remanufactured products 
and the collection yield rate on the firm's expected profit in each channel7 
• What is the impact of the demand uncertainties for the new and remanufactured 
products on the optimal prices, lot sizes and profits in the channels7 
• How do the centralized and decentralized channels compare with each other with 
respect to their optimal prices, lot sizes and profits under different conditions (1 e 
different consumers' perceptions of the remanufactured product versus new, quality 
of returns, and demand uncertainties)7 
In the next chapter, we review the relevant literature Chapters 3, 4 and 5 include the 
models and analysis results for the first, second and third papers (as mentioned above) 
respectively Finally, a summary of all conclusions and future research directions is 
presented in Chapter 6 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a considerable amount of literature on CLSCs General overviews of product 
recovery and remanufactunng can be found in Thierry et al (1995), Fleischmann et al 
(1997), and Guide (2000) In the book edited by Guide and Van Wassenhove (2003), 
some of the business aspects of CLSCs are addressed In addition, in the book edited by 
Dekker et al (2004), further discussions of CLSC problems are covered 
The literature that includes structural and pricing decisions in CLSCs is directly 
related to our research We look at the literature from three different perspectives First, 
from a modeling perspective, we take into account the number of time periods that the 
models include, and we divide the literature into three groups single-period, two-period, 
and multi-penod/infinite horizon/continuous models In addition, in each group, we 
investigate if any of the papers have considered distinguishable new and remanufactured 
products to show the level of competition (substitution) between them Consequently, we 
look into the type of prices determined in each paper, that is, the prices for new and 
remanufactured products, and the core acquisition Second, as the quality of returns is one 
of the factors that we consider in this research, we concentrate on several of the 
aforementioned papers that consider the quality of returns, as well as other papers in the 
literature (l e the ones without pricing decisions) that capture the quality of returns in 
their models Finally, since we consider coordination and structural decisions in CLSCs 
in our research, we review some of the papers capturing this in their models 
Considering the first perspective above, in the single-period models, Savaskan et al 
(2004), and Savaskan and Van Wassenhove (2006) consider indistinguishable new and 
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remanufactured products, and as a result, determine the price for new products only They 
do not investigate any acquisition price in their models Savaskan et al (2004) assume 
fixed unit acquisition price in their models However, Ray et al (2005) determine a trade-
in rebate as an acquisition price while considering indistinguishable new and 
remanufactured products Vadde et al (2007) find the optimal price for remanufactured 
components at a product recovery facility They assume a fixed acquisition price and 
their models do not capture any possible competition between new and remanufactured 
products The literature also considers a remanufacturing firm who determines the 
acquisition price and the price for the remanufactured products without taking into 
account the impact of having new products in the market (Bakal and Akcali, 2006, Guide 
et a l , 2003, Karakayali et a l , 2007) In terms of the number of time periods for 
modeling, our research falls under this group However, we find prices for 
distinguishable new and remanufactured products as well as the core acquisition price 
Note that the core acquisition price is considered in chapters 4 and 5 
In the two-period models, we are not aware of any papers that consider the core 
acquisition price as a decision variable Ferguson and Toktay (2006), as an example in 
this group, consider distinguishable new and remanufactured products in their models and 
determine the optimal prices for each type of product, but they do not deal with the core 
acquisition price in their models Most of the literature in this group, however, assume 
that the new and remanufactured products are not distinguishable and simply define the 
optimal price for new products (Majumder and Groenevelt, 2001, Ferrer and 
Swaminathan, 2006) 
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In the third group of papers, similar to the second group above, Ferrer and 
Swaminathan (2006) consider indistinguishable new and remanufactured products in 
multi-period and infinite-horizon scenarios, while Vorasayan and Ryan (2006) and Debo 
et al (2005) take into account distinguishable new and remanufactured products and 
define two distinct prices for them None of these papers capture the decision-making for 
the core acquisition prices However, Liang et al (2009) determine the core acquisition 
price having it linked to the sale price of the remanufactured products They assume that 
the sale price of the remanufactured product follows a geometric Brownian motion, 
which is extensively used in the option pricing literature, and from there, they define the 
acquisition price However, they do not determine the price for the remanufactured 
product as a decision variable In addition, their models do not consider any possible 
competition of the new product in the market 
It is evident from the summary above that there is a research void regarding decision-
making structures where the prices for new and remanufactured products and the core 
acquisition price are treated as decision variables concurrently We determine these three 
pricing decisions in two of our research papers (I e papers 2 and 3 included in chapters 4 
and 5 respectively) for cases in which the manufacturer is also involved in 
remanufacturing This problem, as mentioned earlier, has not been addressed in the 
literature 
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With regards to the quality of returns, there are quite a few papers that consider it in 
their models Many of these papers deal with the production planning issues in a CLSC 
with remanufacturing, however, some of them consider pricing decisions as we have 
referred to them earlier We can divide these papers into two groups the ones that 
consider a single period and the ones with multi-period models In the single-period 
models, some authors assume the same cost of remanufacturing for all reusable cores 
(Ferrer, 2003, Bakal and Akcah, 2006, Zikopoulos and Tagaras, 2007), while others 
consider different costs of remanufacturing for cores with different levels of quality 
(Guide et a l , 2003, Aras et a l , 2004, Ray et a l , 2005, Galbreth and Blackburn, 2006 and 
2010, Karakayali et a l , 2007, Vadde et al , 2007) Our research falls under this group and 
we assume that the cost of remanufacturing is the same for all remanufacturable cores 
Note that in all our models, the total cost of remanufacturing (which includes the cost of 
materials and core collection) decreases if the quality of returns is higher In the first and 
third papers (l e chapters 3 and 5), we consider a deterministic quality of returns But, in 
the second paper (I e chapter 4), we model a stochastic quality of returns by considering 
a random yield rate for the core collection In the papers with multi-period models, some 
assume deterministic quality levels for cores (Golany et a l , 2001), while others model the 
quality levels using stochastic approaches such as Markov Chain and random outcomes 
(Decroix, 2006, Ferrer and Ketzenberg, 2004, Inderfurth et al , 2001, Toktay et al , 2000, 
Van der Laan et a l , 1999, Denizel et al , 2008) 
With respect to structural decisions and coordination in CLSCs, Debo et al (2004) 
review some of the topics on the supply chain coordination literature, and summarize the 
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papers which examine reverse logistics problems as part of the total supply chain 
structure with an emphasis on pricing, incentive alignment, and information sharing 
Savaskan and Van Wassenhove (2006) consider a manufacturer who sells new products 
through two competing retailers The manufacturer has the option to collect the end-of-
use products directly or through the retailers to use in the production of the new products 
As a result, their new and remanufactured products are not distinguishable They compare 
different collection channels under different coordination scenarios The models are for a 
single period, and the only prices that might be determined (1 e depending on the channel 
structure) are the wholesale price and the retail price at each retailer 
Karakayali et al (2007) analyze how the decentralized channels can be coordinated to 
attain the end-of-hfe product collection rate that can be achieved in the centralized 
channel They consider a single-period model, and investigate how the pricing behaviors 
of the collector and remanufacturer impact the used product collection rates in 
decentralized channels They determine the optimal acquisition price of end-of-hfe 
products and the selling price of the remanufactured products Their models do not 
include any competition between new and remanufactured products, while we capture 
this competition as well as the competition between the manufacturer and the 
remanufacturer in our research Bhattacharya et al (2006) address four different CLSC 
structures Their focus is mainly on determining the optimal order quantities Our 
research in the first paper is similar to their work in terms of considering several 
decision-making CLSC structures However, their models do not include a supplier In 
addition, they do not consider the impact of quality of returns on the decision variables, 
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and they have exogenous prices in their models, while we investigate the impact of 
different levels of quality of returns on the optimal (endogenously determined) prices 
Bhattacharya et al (2006) also assume that the new and remanufactured products are not 
distinguishable We, on the other hand, consider vertically differentiated new and 
remanufactured products 
Savaskan et al (2004) consider three reverse channels for collecting the used products 
(cores) from customers (1) directly from the customer, (2) through the retailer who 
collects the cores for a suitable incentive, (3) subcontracting the core collection to a third 
party However, they do not consider distinguishable new and remanufactured products 
and do not address a joint pricing and lot sizing problem, while we consider 
distinguishable products and in our third paper (in chapter 5), we jointly determine the 
optimal prices and lot sizes for the new and remanufactured products In addition, they 
use deterministic demand functions, we assume deterministic demands in both the first 
and second papers and stochastic demands in the third paper Kaya (2010) considers 
centralized and decentralized channels where the new and remanufactured products are 
partial substitutes (distinguishable) with stochastic demands But, they only address the 
optimal production quantities, while we jointly determine the optimal prices and lot sizes 
in our third paper Moreover, they do not consider the consumers' willingness to pay for 
each product and the quality of returns (or the collection yield rate) However, as 
mentioned earlier, we capture these real-life characteristics in our models 
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As mentioned earlier, in the first paper (1 e chapter 3), we investigate the impact of 
different coordination structures on prices, quantities and profits in a CLSC under 
different settings from the existing literature, and also consider the impact of some 
parameters such as the quality of returns and the consumers' perceptions of 
remanufactured products versus new on the optimal values Next, in the second paper 
(1 e chapter 4), we consider a problem in which the prices for new and remanufactured 
products as well as the core acquisition price are determined by a manufacturer who is 
also in charge of the remanufactunng activities We show how the competition between 
new and remanufactured products influences the optimal pricing decisions Finally, in the 
third paper (1 e chapter 5), we consider centralized and decentralized channels with 
respect to core collection We jointly find the optimal prices and lot sizes for 
differentiated (distinguishable) new and remanufactured products as well as the optimal 
core acquisition prices while assuming a stochastic demand for each product In addition, 
we investigate how the channels compare with each other with respect to the optimal 
decisions In the next chapter, we further discuss the first paper 
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CHAPTER 3 
PAPER 1: 
THE IMPACT OF COORDINATION STRUCTURES 
ON CLOSED-LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN DECISIONS 
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3.1. Model Description and Assumptions 
In this paper, we model a CLSC that includes a retailer who sells new and 
remanufactured products, a manufacturer who only produces new products, and a 
remanufacturer who collects the returned products and uses the reusable parts for 
remanufacturing We also consider a supplier who provides the manufacturer and the 
remanufacturer with new parts This is a rather general setting representative of our 
potential applications 
We consider three CLSC decision-making structures that show different coordination 
options between the retailer and her first tier suppliers The first structure is a completely 
decentralized (CD) one in which each member makes their own pricing decisions 
independently In the second structure, the manufacturer and the retailer are fully 
coordinated and they make pricing decisions as one coordinated unit (MRC) Basically, 
in this structure, we investigate the impact on the optimal prices and the total CLSC profit 
if the retailer develops a very close relationship with the manufacturer defined as the full 
coordination Finally, in the third structure, the retailer and the remanufacturer act as one 
fully coordinated unit in making pricing decisions (RREMC) We do not consider the 
coordination with the supplier, but we investigate the impact of each decision-making 
structure on the supplier's profit Figure 1 shows the CLSC structures 
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In figure 1, the values in parentheses show the quantities of the parts or products 
shipped from one member to another The rest of the notation in the figure show the 
prices charged and costs incurred by the CLSC members Table 1 describes the notation 
used in this paper in more detail 
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qt = Quantity (= demand) for product type i (i = n, r) 
qk = Optimal quantity of product type i in structure k (i = n, r, k = MRC, RREMC, CD) 
P, = Price for product type / (i = n, r) 
Pk = Optimal price for product type / in structure k(i =n,r, k = MRC, RREMC, CD) 
Wi = Wholesale price for product type / (i = n,r) 
Cn = Total cost of new parts in one unit of product (if 100% new parts are used If not, 
a fraction of this cost will be taken into account) 
Cr = Supply cost of reusable parts, incurred by the remanufacturer (cost of providing 
reusable parts out of returned products It can also account for the acquisition costs for 
the returns) 
h = Cost of manufacturing the new product per unit 
Crcm = Cost of remanufacturing per unit 
S = Supply cost of new parts, incurred by the supplier 
Y The portion of parts in a remanufactured product that needs to be replaced by new 
parts 
5 The ratio of consumers' wilhngness-to-pay for remanufactured products to their 
wilhngness-to-pay for new products, 8 e [0,1] 
n / ; = Profit for the retailer 
YlM = Profit for the manufacturer 
Ylrcm = Profit for the remanufacturer 
n s = Profit for the supplier 
TI* = Optimal CLSC profit for structure k(k = MRC, RREMC, CD) 
Table 3 1 Notation 
Because our research is motivated by real-life applications (such as automotive parts, 
mainframe computer systems, office equipment and any aftermarket service parts 
manufacturing and remanufacturing) and the existing academic literature, our models 
capture key properties of new and remanufactured products in the industry, while holding 
some of the useful modeling assumptions of similar models from the literature As with 
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most industry practices mentioned above, new and remanufactured products are 
distinguishable, and each consumer's wilhngness-to-pay for a remanufactured product 
can be defined as a fraction (S) of their wilhngness-to-pay for the new product A 
similar approach is used in Ferguson and Toktay (2006) The product life-cycle is long 
enough to allow both new and remanufactured versions of the same product to be present 
in the market at the same time, as one can find both on the shelves of the retail stores As 
mentioned earlier, some examples are automotive starters, alternators and water-pumps 
The relationships between the manufacturer, remanufacturer, and retailer under study are 
such that they share almost the same amount of power in the CLSC to determine prices 
As a result, it is reasonable to use Differentiated Bertrand models to capture the 
relationships between the members of the CLSC and to explain their (simultaneous) 
decision-making processes 
Regarding the assumptions in our models, there is no capacity constraint either for 
new parts available from the supplier or for the number of returns available for 
remanufacturing While the number of cores available for remanufactunng could be 
limited in some cases, having this assumption in place helps us focus on the main 
research questions without the impact of the capacity constraint In addition, this 
assumption makes the models more tractable (Guide et al 2003) We also assume that 
return rates are independent of sales rates, that is, the market is mature enough and there 
are enough new products sent to the market in previous periods of time (Guide et al 
2003) 
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In our models, no fixed cost is considered for manufacturing or remanufactunng 
Having fixed costs for manufacturing and remanufactunng would just shift the optimal 
values and has no significant impact on the results and insights of this research Our 
models are for a single period as we assume the previous existence of the product in the 
market Consumer demand is assumed to be price sensitive and deterministic Similar 
assumptions are considered by Savaskan et al (2004) and Guide et al (2003) 
The core acquisition cost is assumed to be negligible Similar to Bhattacharya et al 
(2006), the core acquisition cost and related decisions are not the focus of this research 
We concentrate on the implications of the quality of the collected cores on the optimal 
profits in different CLSC structures In addition, due to the nature of the products under 
study, the cores could be remanufactured multiple times This helps us not to be 
constrained by the number of remanufactured products to be less than the number of new 
products sold at the retailer Moreover, the consumer wilhngness-to-pay is heterogeneous 
and uniformly distributed in the interval [0,1] and the market size is normalized to 1 As 
we show in Appendix A, expressions (3 1) and (3 2) hold among prices and quantities 
P„=\-qtt-Sqr (3 1) 
Pr = S{\-q„-qr) (3 2) 
In our models, all supply chain members have access to the same information when 
making decisions This assumption allows us to control for the impact of information 
asymmetry and focus our attention on the quality of returns and the consumers' 
perception of the remanufactured products versus new in different CLSC structures A 
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similar assumption is seen in Savaskan et al (2004) In the next section, we introduce the 
models and discuss the optimal values in more detail 
3.2. Model Formulations and Analysis 
In this section, we introduce our models and derive the optimal prices and quantities 
for new and remanufactured products in each CLSC structure We also compare the 
prices as well as the supplier's and the total optimal CLSC profits across the structures 
Furthermore, we analyze the impact of the quality of returns and the consumers' 
perceptions on the optimal profits 
3 2 1 Models and optimal values for CLSC structures 
Here we present the profit functions for each CLSC member and the supplier, as well 
as the optimal prices and quantities for new and remanufactured products 
In the CD structure, the profit functions are defined as follows 
nR=qAP„-WJ + qr(Pr-Wr) (3 3) 
nM=qn(Wn-Cn-h) (3 4) 
nb=(q„+nr)(C„-S) (3 5) 
nna=qr(K-B) (3 6) 
where B = yCn +(\-y)Cr +Cnm represents the total cost of remanufacturing per unit and 
we have qn > 0 and qr > 0 
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In the other structures, any time that a member is coordinated with another, the profit 
of the coordinated unit is given by the summation of the profit functions for those 
members as presented above The business and decision-making responsibilities are 
similar in all structures However, in any case in which there is a coordinated joint unit in 
the CLSC, the unit makes pricing decisions on belalf of all members included in it For 
example, in the MRC structure, the manufacturer and the retailer jointly set the retail 
price for the new product This pricing decision making, which is prevalent in the supply 
chain literature, gives us the optimal values as if those members were fully coordinated 
In the following, we use the CD structure as a representative for all structures to show 
how we calculate the optimal values for the retail prices and quantities of new and 
remanufactured products The derivations are similar for the other structures given their 
own characteristics 
The retailer sells both new and remanufactured products So her profit function (IT;() 
consists of the profit from new products as well as the one from remanufactured products 
The remanufacturer collects the end-of-life products, tests and cleans them, and uses the 
reusable parts from them in the remanufactunng He replaces worn-out parts with new 
parts in order to obtain remanufactured products with acceptable quality So, the average 
cost of parts used in one unit of the remanufactured product is the summation of the cost 
of new parts and the cost of reusable parts, that is, yCn + (\ — y)Cr Here y shows the 
proportion of the parts in a particular remanufactured product that are new parts Since 
not all parts are identical in a finished product, y is defined as the average dollar value of 
the parts that need to be replaced divided by the total dollar value of all parts in the 
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product As a result, a higher y stands for a lower average quality in the end-of-hfe 
returns, as more used parts would need to be replaced by new parts with higher total 
dollar value The total cost of remanufactunng per unit is defined as 
B = yCn+(\-y)Cr+Crcm 
In the CD structure, the retailer sets the prices for new and remanufactured products to 
maximize her own profit based on the wholesale prices that she receives from the 
manufacturer and remanufacturer Because the retail prices affect the demand for new 
and remanufactured products, and retailer's order quantities change accordingly, they 
have an indirect impact on the profits of the manufacturer and remanufacturer Knowing 
this, the manufacturer and remanufacturer set their wholesale prices in a way to maximize 
their own profits If they set high wholesale prices, th© retailer will have to set higher 
retail prices, which in turn decreases the demand for new and remanufactured products 
and the order quantities from the retailer to the manufacturer and remanufacturer 
Wholesale prices, then, are determined by finding the best response to the best response 
of the retailer 
The analysis starts by finding the values of qn and qr in terms of Pn and Pr from 
expressions (3 1) and (3 2) In order to find the optimal retail prices Pn and Pr and 
quantities qn and qr in terms of the wholesale prices Wn and Wr, we consider the 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and use the followig equation for the retailer 
LR=q„(Pn-WJ + qr(Pr-Wr) + junqn+Mrqr (3 7) 
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This expression incorporates constraints qn > 0 and qr > 0 Note that the optimal 
conditions to be satisfied include dLR/dPn = 0 , dLR/dPr = 0, /Jnqn = 0 and /Jrqr = 0 It 
is straightforward to show that the profit function for the retailer is a concave function 
and we have a convex set of constraints Hence, the solution to the KKT conditions is a 
unique optimal solution Next, we substitute these values for prices and quantities (in 
terms of wholesale prices) in expressions (3 4) and (3 6) and find the optimal wholesale 
prices set by the manufacturer and the remanufacturer through solving the best response 
equations of each to another Finally, we substitute these optimal wholesale prices in the 
optimal retail prices Pn and Pr and quantities qn and qr that we found earlier to define 
them in terms of the model parameters 
Solving the KKT conditions leads us to consider four different cases as follows 
Case 1 qn > 0, qr > 0, jun = 0 and jur = 0 
Case 2 qn > 0, qr = 0, //„ = 0 and [ir > 0 
Case 3 qn = 0, qr > 0, //„ > 0 and jur = 0 
Case 4 qn = 0, qr = 0 , /.in > 0 and fir > 0 
The analysis of these cases is included in Appendix B It is intuitive to say that case 4 
is not feasible, because none of the players will exist if the conditions in this case are in 
place Figure 2 shows the summary of our analysis for the rest of the cases Calculations 
for Figure 2 are also included in Appendix B We find that depending on how unit costs 
of manufacturing and remanufactunng compare with each other, a different case may be 
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feasible If the unit cost of manufacturing is high enough as we have in region 2 of Figure 
2, when the retailer coordinates with the remanufacturer, it is optimal for her (or in other 
words for the whole CLSC) not to sell any new products The new product becomes less 
desirable if the unit cost of manufacturing goes even higher than a certain amount as we 
have in region 3 In that case, no matter which coordination structure is in place, the 
CLSC will be better off if the retailer does not sell any new product 
On the other hand, if the unit cost of remanufactunng becomes higher than a certain 
amount, as we have in region 4, the retailer will decide not to sell any remanufactured 
products if she is coordinated with the manufacturer The remanufactured product 
becomes less desirable if the unit cost of remanufactunng goes even higher In that case, 
as we have in region 5, no matter which coordination structure is in place, the CLSC will 
be better off if the retailer does not sell any remanufactured products 
However, if the unit costs of manufacturing and remanufactunng vary in a certain 
range compared to each other, as we have in region 1, both players will exist in the 
market and the retailer will sell both new and remanufactured products Since the 
manufacturer and the remanufacturer in our study exist in the market, that is, they are 
producing positive quantities of products and selling them through the retailer, it is safe 
to assume that the model that explains the current situation the best is associated with the 
first case Having this in mind, we focus the rest of our analysis on case 1 Table 2 shows 
the optimal values for the retail prices and quantities of new and remanufactured products 
for all structures in case 1 
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Table 3 2 Optimal retail prices and quantities for new and remanufactured products 
3 2 2 Comparison of prices and quantities across structures 
In this section, we present our analysis with respect to the optimal prices and 
quantities across structures We first explain the underlying conditions for the analysis 
and then discuss the results in the following sub-sections 
3 2 2 1 The underlying conditions 
We need to determine the conditions that the model parameters should hold in order 
for case 1 to be feasible As explained in Appendix B, we can summarize these 
conditions as follows 
Condition 1 S(C„+h)>B (38) 
Condition 2 Cn+h<B + (\-S) (3 9) 
where B =
 7Cn+{\-Y)Cr+Cnm 
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Condition 1, represented by expression (3 8), implies that the unit cost of 
remanufacturing should be low enough relative to the unit cost of manufacturing in order 
for remanufacturing to become a feasible option Condition 2, represented by expression 
(3 9), implies that the unit cost of manufacturing should not be too high relative to the 
unit cost of remanufacturing, otherwise, manufacturing will not be feasible 
3 2 2 2 Comparison of prices 
In Appendix C, we show analytically how the optimal prices for the new products 
compare with each other across different CLSC structures Similarly, we are able to show 
the comparison of the prices for the remanufactured product The following summarizes 
the results for new product prices as well as prices for remanufactured products across 
different structures 
pMRC
 < pRREMC < pCD ,~ . QS 
pllllLMC
 < pMRC < pCD C3 1 H 
In pricing the new products, the MRC structure can set a lower price since the double 
marginahzation for new products does not exist in this structure In the RREMC and CD 
structures, the retailer is not coordinating with the manufacturer and, as a result, there 
exists a double marginahzation due to the manufacturer's wholesale price Therefore, the 
prices are expected to be higher than the ones in the MRC structure 
In the RREMC structure, however, the retailer, who is coordinating with the 
remanufacturer, is able to set a low price for the remanufactured products If she sets the 
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price for new products as high as the one in the CD structure, new products could not 
compete with the remanufactured products in the market and, as a result, the retailer 
would lose too much of the demand for new products, which would not be desirable for 
her In this case, she sets a price lower than the one in the CD stucture but still higher 
than the lowest price in the MRC structure due to the existing double marginalization in 
RREMC 
The same type of reasoning explains how the prices for remanufactured products 
compare with each other across structures In the RREMC structure, a lower retail price is 
charged for the remanufactured products since there is no double marginalization In the 
MRC structure, there is double marginalization for the remanufactured product, so a 
higher price is set compared to the RREMC structure However, due to the low price for 
new products in this structure, the price for the remanufactured product is set low enough 
so that it can compete with the new product in the market As a result, a lower price is 
charged compared to the CD structure 
3 2 2 3 Comparison of quantities 
In Appendix C, we also analytically prove how the optimal quantities compare with 
each other across CLSC structures The comparison of optimal quantities across CLSC 
structures is summarized as follows 
q'„UiLMC <qCf <qT (3 1 2 ) 
qmC <q(f <qrMC ( 3 1 3 ) 
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Looking at the results above, one may think at first that the prices for the new and 
remanufactured products are deriving the quantities sold at the retailer While it is true for 
the number of new products sold in the MRC structure, by taking a closer look at the CD 
and RREMC structures in expression (3 12), we see that a higher number of the new 
product is sold at the CD structure while a higher price is charged compared to 
the RREMC structure A similar observation holds for the remanufactured product in 
the CD and MRC structures As a result, we can conclude that if the retailer coordinates 
with the manufacturer, she will sell a higher number of new products and a lower number 
of remanufactured products compared to the completely decentralized channel On the 
other hand, if the retailer coordinates with the remanufacturer, she will sell a lower 
number of new products and a higher number of remanufactured products compared to 
the completely decentralized structure 
3 2 3 Numerical analysis 
In this section, we provide a numerical analysis to further develop insight First, we 
explain how we set the parameters of the analysis Then we compare the CLSC optimal 
profits across the structures and investigate the impact of the quality of returns and the 
consumers' perception on these profits Finally, we compare the supplier's profit across 
the structures or in other words, we analyze the impact of the CLSC coordination 
structure decisions on the supplier's profit 
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3 2 3 1 Parameter setting 
For setting parameters, we need to take some conditions into account One condition is 
that our cost factors, such as the unit cost of manufacturing, h , the unit cost of new parts, 
Cn, the unit cost of remanufactunng, Crem , and the unit cost of reusable parts, Cr, should 
be set such that the prices take values smaller than 1 while resulting in feasible (positive) 
quantities of new and remanufactured products Another condition is related to the range 
of values that 5 and y can take, that is, values between (0, 1) In addition, we consider 
conditions 1 and 2 from expressions (3 8) and (3 9) in section 3 2 2 to determine the 
feasible ranges of 5 and y for the analysis In our analysis, the original set of values that 
we used for C„, Crcm, Cr, h, and S includes {0 01, 0 02, 0 03, , 0 1}, but, since the 
results were consistent across these different values, we show our results based on the 
specific set of parameters as follows C„= 0 03, Crcm= 0 01, Cr= 0 02, h = 0 03, S = 
0 01, 8 e [0 66,0 96], y e [0 3,0 9] As mentioned, we have done an extensive numerical 
analysis and the results that follow in the next sections are consistent across different sets 
of parameter values 
3 2 3 2 The impact of quality of returns on optimal CLSC profits across structures 
Our numerical analysis shows that the optimal CLSC profits in all structures decrease 
with a reduction in the quality of returns, that is, with an increase in y This is a 
reasonable result since the cost of remanufactunng increases with the reduction in the 
quality of returns and it leads to a higher total cost in the CLSC Thus, the total profit of 
the CLSC will be lower 
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Our results show that the reduction in the CLSC profit is less than 1% in each 
structure when y changes in the range from 0 3 to 0 9 This is because when the quality 
of returns decreases, the remanufactured product becomes less competitive to the new 
product (because of the higher cost of remanufactunng and resulting higher retail price) 
and more new products are sold at the retailer, generating more profit in the CLSC to 
compensate for the reduction in the profit from the remanufactured products As a result, 
the total CLSC profit does not change significantly This also shows that a reduction in 
the quality of returns reduces the remanufacturer's profit while it increases the 
manufacturer's profit 
3 2 3 3 The impact of consumers' perceptions on optimal CLSC profits across structures 
Our results show that the CLSC profits have an ascending trend with the increase in 
the consumers' perceptions of the remanufactured product versus new, 8 More 
specifically, with an increase in 8 in the range from 0 66 to 0 96, the profit of the CD 
structure increases by almost 8%, RREMC by 10 7% and MRC by 1 3% As we see, the 
change in the MRC structure is not as significant when compared to CD and RREMC 
structures This shows that the CLSC profits in the CD and RREMC structures are the 
most sensitive to the consumers' perception of the remanufactured product versus new 
As a result, if the retailer coordinates with the manufacturer, the total CLSC profit stays 
more stable against any possible change in the consumer's perception of the products 
3 2 3 4 The comparison of the CLSC profits across structures 
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Looking at the CLSC profits with respect to y, we see that the profit for the MRC 
structure, Yl*MRC, is higher than the ones for the other structures This result is also 
consistent when we look at the change in the CLSC profits with respect to 8 As our 
results show, the order for the profit of the other structures, from higher to lower, is CD 
and RREMC for all levels of the quality of returns when 0 66 < 8 < 0 93 So the 
following ranking holds under the aforementioned conditions 
n;uyA,f < n » < n M f 0 14) 
This suggests that the CLSC will be more profitable if the retailer coordinates with the 
manufacturer The coordination with the remanufacturer will decrease the CLSC's profit 
compared to the case of having a completely decentralized channel From a supply chain 
management perspective, there is a need for appropriate contracts to be in place in order 
to achieve the highest CLSC profit through coordinating the retailer and the 
manufacturer, however we do not focus on the contracts in this paper Figure 3 shows 
how the profits across the structures change with respect to 8 These profit values almost 
converge when 8 > 0 93 and the order given in expression (3 14) changes Although the 
differences among the profits across the structures are not large, we find that when the 
new and remanufactured products are perceived as very close substitutes (I e 8 > 0 93), 
a decentralized channel could perform better than the others in terms of the total profit of 
the CLSC However, distinguishable new and remanufactured products under our study 
are perceived by consumers in a way that it makes it reasonable not to have very high 8 
Thus, we focus on the range 0 66 < 8 < 0 93 for this analysis 
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In the next section, we look at the supplier's side and investigate the impact of the 
CLSC members' decision for the coordination structure on the supplier's profit This 
helps us find how the second tier supplier will be affected by the structural decisions 
made by the CLSC downstream 
0 23 -r 
0 225 
o 
Q . 
o 
w 
_i o 
0 22 
0215 
0 21 
0 205 -
-CLSC profit (CD) 
CLSC profit (MRC) 
CLSC profit (RREMC) 
0 66 0 71 0 76 0 81 0 86 0 91 0 96 
Figure 3 3 Optimal profits across structures with respect to S 
3 2 3 5 The impact of CLSC structural decisions on the supplier's profit 
Our analysis shows that the supplier would rather have the retailer and the 
manufacturer to be coordinated, that is, the MRC structure to be in place Because it will 
result in a higher profit for him This is consistent with the optimal structural decision of 
the CLSC members to choose the MRC structure for a higher CLSC profit As a result, 
the optimal decision of the CLSC members will have a good impact on the supplier's 
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profit In addition, the supplier will only prefer the RREMC structure over the CD 
structure if the quality of returns is low Otherwise, having the CD structure will result in 
a higher profit for the supplier than RREMC 
3.3. Managerial Insight 
This study shows that it will be more profitable for the CLSC if the retailer and the 
manufacturer coordinate with each other in their pricing decisions Also, from the 
supplier's point of view, coordination between the manufacturer and the retailer is 
preferred, which shows that there will be no conflict between the interests of the CLSC 
members and the supplier in terms of the best coordination structure In addition, our 
results show that the coordination between the retailer and the remanufacturer leads to a 
lower profit for the CLSC members than the one in a completely decentralized case We 
find that although the total profit of the retailer and the remanufacturer is higher when 
they are coordinated, the competition that exists between new and remanufactured 
products hurts the manufacturer's profit so much that the total CLSC profit becomes less 
than what it would be in the completely decentralized structure However, if the quality 
of returns is low, the supplier will enjoy a higher profit from the coordination between the 
retailer and the remanufacturer compared to the completely decentralized case 
In addition, we find that a lower quality of returns decreases the total CLSC profit, but 
this reduction is less than 1% However, the remanufacturer faces a higher decrease in his 
profit while the manufacturer enjoys an increase in the profit Furthermore, we find that a 
higher consumers' perception for the remanufactured product versus new, which makes 
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the new and remanufactured products closer substitutes, will result in a higher CLSC 
profit, especially in the completely decentralized structure and the one with coordinated 
retailer and remanufacturer 
3.4. Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
This paper shows how the coordination options in a CLSC compare with each other 
To do this, we present the optimal profits for the CLSC and the supplier in addition to the 
optimal prices and quantities for the new and remanufactured products at the retailer The 
CLSC in this paper consists of a manufacturer, a remanufacturer, and a retailer We also 
consider a supplier to provide both the manufacturer and remanufacturer with new parts 
We aim to provide managers in a CLSC with insights that help them determine what 
coordination structure is better for the CLSC and how the optimal prices are set across 
the structures In addition, we consider the structural decision from a supplier's 
perspective, that is, to find which option the supplier would choose were it up to him to 
decide on the coordination structure Motivated by real-life practice, we model the CLSC 
for vertically differentiated new and remanufactured products We capture this 
differentiation by the consumers' perception or relative willingness-to-pay for the 
remanufactured product versus new We also consider the quality of returns and its 
impact on the optimal profits 
We acknowledge that this research has certain limitations that could be relaxed for 
future research For instance, we did not consider any direct cost of collection for the 
used product returns and we did not include any decisions related to the acquisition cost 
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of the returns as it was not the focus of this research However, this cost can be included 
in the cost of reusable parts in our models In addition, we determine the core acquisition 
price and the direct cost of collection in our second and third papers Another limitation 
in our models is that we assumed no capacity constraint for the CLSC members and the 
supplier Using capacitated inventory models jointly with pricing can be considered for 
future research In addition, we assumed negligible cost of coordination among members 
of the CLSC This may not be the case when the necessary infrastructure for 
communication and coordination is not in place, which makes the coordination more 
difficult and costly The cost of coordination could easily be added as a fixed cost to our 
models for those cases 
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CHAPTER 4 
PAPER 2: 
OPTIMAL CORE ACQUISITION AND PRODUCT 
PRICES FOR HYBRID MANUFACTURING/ 
REMANUFACTURING SYSTEMS 
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4.1. Model Description and Assumptions 
In this chapter, we investigate the pricing decisions that a firm needs to make for new 
and remanufactured products and also for the end of life/use core acquisition Examples 
of such a firm are Fenco and Cardone in the aftermarket automotive parts industry These 
companies are involved in producing both new and remanufactured products We use 
simple economic models to show the impact of the substitutabihty between new and 
remanufactured products on all pricing decisions We also consider the cases in which the 
firm sells her products directly to the end-consumers, that is, we do not consider any 
retailer or other intermediary supply chain members in our models This helps us focus 
on the decisions that the company needs to make and the influencing factors in place, as 
we do not want any other factors like the retailer's ordering policy and so on have an 
impact on the real demand that should finally be satisfied at the end-consumer level Our 
models could also be applied to the cases in which the firm sells her products through a 
retailer where the firm and the retailer are fully coordinated and make pricing decisions 
as a joint unit 
We assume that the supply of cores is a deterministic linear function of the acquisition 
price, Pa, paid to the end-consumers to return their used products The deterministic 
linear function takes the form S{Pa) -a + f3Pa, indicating that with an increase in the 
acquisition price, more cores will be expected to be collected, where a and [5 are 
positive coefficients We do not consider cases in which the consumers have to pay a fee 
to return their end-of-use or end-of-life products (which would require a negative value 
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for Pa), assumed by some of the researchers in the literature (Bakal and Akcah, 2006, 
Guide et a l , 2003) 
In addition, we look at the product as a single part that can be remanufactured and we 
do not consider multiple parts in our models After the cores are purchased, they have to 
go through a cleaning and inspection process We assume that this process costs c, per 
unit for the company The percentage of the parts that conform to the quality 
specifications is a random variable Parts that are not remanufacturable or not 
remanufactured are salvaged (1 e sold to a material recycler) The unit salvage price is s 
per unit The salvage price is not dependent on the quality of parts to be recycled, but is 
proportional to the recyclable material content in the parts which is the same for a single 
part We also consider the same remanufactunng cost per unit for all remanufacturable 
parts, denoted by cr in our models Similar modeling assumptions are used in the 
literature for related practical examples (for example, see Bakal and Akcah, 2006) The 
cost of manufacturing a unit of new product is denoted by cn The demand quantities for 
new and remanufactured products are denoted by qn and qr, and prices by pn and pr 
respectively 
The company sets the prices for new and remanufactured products to maximize his 
own profit as a monopoly, that is, we do not consider the competition with other 
companies to be able to focus on the main aspects of this research As it is observed in 
industries such as automotive parts, new and remanufactured products are distinguishable 
and each consumer's willingness-to-pay (WTP) or valuation for the remanufactured 
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product can be defined as a fraction (S) of their WTP for the new product In our 
models, we denote the market size by M The market size is an estimation of all potential 
consumers that could be reached by the firm We denote the maximum WTP of any 
consumer for any product (which obviously will be for the new product) by ^ In 
addition, the consumers' WTP is distributed uniformly in the interval [0 ,^ ] and, in any 
period, each consumer uses at most one unit Similar models are used in Ferguson and 
Toktay (2006) Equations (4 1) and (4 2) hold as the inverse demand functions Appendix 
A explains the derivation of these functions in more detail 
'.=£("-«.-*,> <4I) 
M 
Pr=^-{SM-Sqn-Sqr) (4 2) 
M 
The condition of the cores to be acquired has a probability distribution g(r), with a 
cumulative distribution function G(r) Unlike what was used by Bakal and Akcah (2006), 
we use a yield rate that is absolutely random and independent of the acquisition price 
This is due to the fact that there is no guarantee that increasing the core acquisition price 
will bring in cores with higher quality However, it is intuitive to assume that the number 
of returns will indeed increase with a higher acqisition price, because, the consumers will 
gain a higher incentive by returning their end of life/use products Table 4 1 presents the 
notation used in this paper 
c Unit cost of manufacturing new products 
c Unit cost of remanufactunng 
Cj Unit cost of cleaning and inspection 
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Pa Unit acquisition price paid to the end-consumers 
S(Pa) Supply of returns 
s Unit salvage price 
8 The ratio of consumers' WTP for remanufactured products to their 
WTP for new products, 8 e (0,1) 
qn Demand quantity for the new product 
qr Demand quantity for the remanufactured product 
Pn Price for the new product 
Pr Price for the remanufactured product 
Yl{Pa ,Pn,Pr) Profit function of the manufacturer/remanufacturer 
(p Maximum consumers' valuation of the new product 
R Random variable denoting the yield rate 
r A realization of the random variable R 
g(r), G(r) p d f and c d f of random variable R 
Table 4 1 Notation 
The profit of the firm is a function of the prices that he should determine optimally 
The following model shows the firm's total profit considering new and remanufactured 
products and the core acquisition process 
Maxn(Pa,P„,Pr) = qn(Pn-cn) + qr(Pr-s-cr) + S(Pa)(s-Pa-cl) (4 3) 
Subject to qr < rS(Pa) (4 4) 
As mentioned earlier, our aim is to develop insight regarding the optimal prices for the 
new and remanufactured products and also for the core acquisition when the competition 
between the products is taken into account We would also like to know more about the 
impact of some of the model parameters, such as the consumers' perceptions of the 
remanufactured products versus new, the quality of returns (I e the yield rate), and the 
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salvage value on the optimal prices and the profit of the firm For this purpose, we have 
to solve the maximization problem above to find the optimal prices and from there, the 
optimal quantities and profit of the firm In the next section, we describe our analysis and 
the results 
4.2. Model Analysis and Results 
We use a simultaneous optimization in which the optimal prices for the new and 
remanufactured products as well as the acquisition price for the core supply are found 
simultaneously As Bakal and Akcali (2006) mention, there could be other ways to find 
the optimal prices For example, the firm could use a two-stage decision process in which 
she sets the core acquisition price first, and after collecting the cores and realization of 
the yield rate, she would set the price for the new and remanufactured products Since we 
are maximizing a concave function over a convex set of constraints, either the solution 
that satisfies the first order condition is optimal or the constraint is binding As a result, 
under each condition, we can find the optimal solution In addition, due to the fact that 
the closed form solutions are generally not available, we use a numerical analysis to 
investigate the impact of the model parameters on the optimal values As mentioned 
earlier, we assume that the core supply function can be represented by a linear function 
such as S(Pa) = a + f3Pa Substituting this linear function into expression (4 3) and 
solving the first order conditions, we have 
2 
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This solution is feasible (and optimal) if it satisfies constraint (4 4), that is, 
qr < rS(Pa) If it does not satisfy the constraint, it means that the constraint is binding, 
that is qr =rS(Pa) If the constraint is binding, we find Pa in terms of qr and thus in 
terms of Pn and Pr Then, we can solve for the optimal Pn and Pr, and consequently, the 
core acquisition price (Pa) 
The numerical analysis of the model is performed using an algorithm The algorithm 
considers the constraint that we have in this model, that is qr <rS(Pa) We can re-
arrange the constraint to r > —-— We need to find under what conditions the solution 
S(Pa) 
to the first order conditions satisfies the constraint For that, we solve the first order 
conditions and find the values of qr and S(Pa)* corresponding to that solution Then, 
we find the value of —- Let's assume that K denotes this value (which is associated 
S(Pa) 
with the solution for the first order conditions) As a result, whenever r > K, the solution 
to the first order conditions satisfies the constraint and it is the optimal solution to the 
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model Note that both qr and S(Pa)* above are found in terms of the model parameters 
Thus, K is defined by the model parameters This gives us the idea that we can first 
calculate K based on the model parameters, and then see under what condition, the 
solution to the first order conditions would satisfy the constraint and become the optimal 
solution to the model Considering this with the fact that r is a realization for the random 
variable R as the yield rate (which can fluctuate between 0 and 1), the following 
algorithm is used for the numerical analysis 
Step 1) Find the solution to the first order conditions 
Step 2) Calculate qr and S(Pa) , and from there, K = • 
S(Pa) 
Step 3) If K < 1 => go to step 4 Otherwise, go to Step 7 
Step 4) If r > K => the solution to the first order conditions is optimal and the expected 
profit for this part can be obtained by \ Tlxg(r)dr in which EI, is the firm's profit for 
each realization of the yield rate in the range [K, 1) which is calculated using equation 
(4 3) and based on the optimal values 
Step 5) If r < K => the constraint should be binding As a result, the solution based on 
this will define II2 as the firm's profit for each realization of the yield rate in the range 
(0, K) which is used to calculate the expected profit for this case as f Yl2g(r)dr 
Step 6) Calculate the total expected profit as f Yl{g(r)dr + [ Tl2g(r)dr 
Step 7) If K > 1 => r ~i. K or in other words r < 1 < K In this case, the constraint has to 
be binding for the optimal solution which results in n 3 as the firm's profit for each 
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realization of the yield rate in the range (0, 1) So, calculate the total expected profit as 
[U,g{r)dr 
In addition, we calculate the expected values for all three prices (1 e the ones for the 
new and remanufactured products as well as the core acquisition) and the optimal 
quantities in a similar way Thus, all the values used in our analysis in this paper refer to 
the expected optimal prices, quantities and profit of the firm and we investigate the 
impacts of some of the model parameters on these values 
4 2 1 Parameter Setting for the Numerical Analysis 
In our analysis, the original set of values that we use for cn included {50, 55, 60, 65, 
70, 75, 80, 85, 90, 95, 100} and the one for cr included {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 
50}, the one for c, included {3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19}, and the one for^ included 
{100, 200, 300, 400, 500} But, since the results were consistent across different sets of 
these values, we present our results based on the specific parameter set as follows 
c„=70 
c r =15 
c , = 5 
s={l,9, 11, 13, 15, 17} 
J = {0 6, 0 65, 0 7, 0 75,0 8, 0 85} 
^ = {100,500} 
M = 5 0 0 
g(r)~N(^,<72) 
// = {0 3,0 35, 0 4, 0 45, 0 5, 0 55} 
a = {0 04, 0 07, 0 1,0 13,0 16} 
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In practice, cn can be estimated based on the total number of working hours required 
to manufacture one unit of the new product multiplied by an average wage per hour plus 
the material cost per unit of the new product In a similar way, the unit costs of 
remanufactunng (c r ) and inspection (c , ) can be estimated by the total number of 
working hours required per unit multiplied by the average wage per hour The number 
used for market size (M) does not have an impact on the results of this research That is, 
having a larger number for M simply magnifies the scale of the business, but the type of 
impact that the parameters under this study have on the optimal values would not be 
affected 
To capture a wider range of products and consumers, we have assumed high and low 
values for the maximum consumer WTP for the new product, that is, Tjj - 500 and 
q> = 100 Considering the fact that the other parameters stay the same for each of these 
two values, the lower q> would mean that the cost factors constitute a higher percentage 
of the final price of the products, that is, the profit margin will be lower On the other 
hand, if the consumers are willing to pay significantly more for the products (1 e q> is 
much higher), the profit margin will be also significantly higher In our numerical 
analysis, we consider these two cases as low and high profit margins cases and compare 
the differences between them Note that Bakal and Akcah (2006) assume high and low 
salvage values in order to change the profit margins of the remanufactured products (or 
cores if they are not remanufactured) In addition, we consider a range for the consumers' 
relative WTP for the remanufactured product versus new (t>) which results in feasible 
solutions for all ranges of the whole parameter set that we use in this study Finally, we 
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assume that the yield rate has a normal distribution and that the values for the mean and 
standard deviation are selected in a way that the probability of having a yield rate less 
than 0 or higher than 1 is negligible In the following sections, we discuss the impact of 
some of the model parameters such as the consumers' relative WTP for the 
remanufactured product (that captures the level of competition between new and 
remanufactured products), the yield rate, etc on the optimal prices and profits Note that 
in the figures of this section, P_n, P_r, and P_a represent the prices for the new and 
remanufactured product, and the core acquisition respectively In addition, q_n and q_r 
denote the quantities of the new and remanufactured products sold In addition, S(P_a) 
shows the number of cores that are acquired The terms "high" and "low" in parentheses 
stand for the high and low margin cases respectively 
4 2 2 Impact of consumers' relative WTP for the remanufactured product (8) 
For this part of the analysis, we consider the case of 8 = 0 6 as the benchmark and 
vary 8 parametncally in order to measure its impact on the optimal prices, quantities and 
the profit of the firm Our analysis shows that the price for the new product does not 
change if the new and remanufactured products are perceived as closer substitutes But, 
as we can see in Figure 4 1 and the table attached to it, when the new and remanufactured 
products are perceived as closer substitutes (l e having a higher 8), a higher price should 
be charged for the remanufactured product and a higher acquisition price should be paid 
for the core supply If we vary 8 from 0 6 to 0 85, we observe that the percentage change 
in the price for the remanufactured product is consistent between the cases of high and 
low profit margins (l e it is around 41% - 45% in both cases) However, when the new 
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and remanufactured products are very close substitutes, a lower increase in the 
acquisition price is needed for the case of high profit margin (1 e around 34%) compared 
to the low profit margin case (1 e around 54%) 
Figure 4 1 Impact of 8 on the expected optimal prices 
As for quantities of new and remanufactured products to be sold, according to Figure 
4 2 and its data table, when these products are closer substitutes (l e when we have a 
higher 5), fewer number of new products will be sold compared to the case of having a 
lower 8 In addition, the percentage of reduction in the sale of the new product is much 
higher for the case of low profit margins (l e around 97%) compared to high (l e around 
21%) That is, when the profit margins are low, a higher reduction in the sales of the new 
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product is expected when the new and remanufactured products are closer substitutes As 
we show in table 4 2, this can be explained by the relative profit margin of the new 
product versus the one for the remanufactured product In the case of having low 
margins, when 8 increases, the profit margin for the remanufactured product increases 
from 2 2 times the profit margin of the new product to 3 7 times The change for the case 
of high margins is from 0 7 to 1 02 As we see, the relative profit margin of the 
remanufactured product increases a lot more in the case of having low margins This is 
the reason that we see a sharper decrease in the number of new products sold in this case 
Additionally, when S is higher, it is optimal to increase the sales of the remanufactured 
product This need for additional sales of the remanufactured product calls for a higher 
number of cores to be collected Thus, paying a higher core acquisition price (mentioned 
earlier in this section) seems reasonable 
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06 
0 65 
07 
0 75 
08 
0 85 
Low margin 
Margin for 
new (A) 
15 00 
15 00 
15 00 
15 00 
15 00 
15 00 
Margin for 
reman (B) 
33 32 
37 46 
41 68 
46 00 
50 44 
55 03 
B/A 
2 22 
2 50 
2 78 
3 07 
3 36 
3 67 
High margin 
Margin for 
new (C) 
214 99 
214 99 
214 99 
214 99 
214 99 
214 99 
Margin for 
reman (D) 
151 00 
163 55 
176 29 
189 65 
203 98 
218 98 
D/C 
0 70 
0 76 
0 82 
0 88 
0 95 
1 02 
Table 4 2 Relative profit margins for new and remanufactured products in low and high 
margin cases with respect to 8 
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Regarding the expected profit of the firm, as Figure 4 3 and its table show, we can see 
that when the new and remanufactured products are closer substitutes, the firm can expect 
a higher profit This is because of the higher number of remanufactured products that can 
now be sold for a higher price and, as a result, a higher profit margin In addition, in the 
case of having low profit margins, the firm's expected profit is a lot more sensitive to the 
consumers' relative perception of the new and remanufactured products This can also be 
explained by the fact that the remanufactured product will have a much higher increase in 
the profit margin in the low margin case when 8 goes up from 0 6 to 0 85, and this will 
result in a more dramatic increase in the profit 
o 
CI 
c ra 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
-10% 
f 
S 
-^ 
>~X 
^ d l f c - • * - * * 
- * • = • • * = -
0 65 0 7 0 75 0 8 0 85 
->K_ Change in 
Expected profit (high) 
0 20% 0 50% 0 92% 1 48% 2 19% 
-O— Change in 
Expected profit (low) 
9 47% 20 10% 32 02% 45 42% 60 54% 
Figure 4 3 Impact of 5 on the expected optimal profits of the firm 
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4 2 3 Impact of the yield rate and its uncertainty 
As mentioned earlier, we assume that the yield rate has a Normal distribution with a 
mean of // and a standard deviation of a A higher fj, implies that on average the cores 
have a higher quality A higher a implies that the cores are not that consistent in terms 
of the quality and the uncertainty in the yield rate is higher Our analysis shows that the 
price of the new product is rather robust with respect to the average yield rate changes 
That is, in both high and low margin cases, it will increase around 0 11-0 13% and will 
stay almost constant at that level Figure 4 4 shows the percentages of change in all three 
prices (I e the ones for new and remanufactured products plus the core acquisition price) 
with respect to /j. It is evident that when the average yield rate // increases from 0 3 to 
0 55, there is a slight decrease in the price of the remanufactured product in the low 
margin case (I e 3 1% reduction) But this price does not change significantly in the high 
margin case and it almost stays constant after a 0 06% increase We also observe that the 
core acquisition price decreases slightly in the low margin case (I e 1 56%) However, it 
stays almost constant after a slight reduction of 0 06% in the high margin case 
As we can see in Figure 4 5 for the percentages of change in the quantities, when the 
average yield rate increases from 0 3 to 0 55, it will be optimal to sell a higher number of 
the remanufactured product in both cases of high and low margin However, a much 
higher increase in the sale of the remanufactured product is expected for the case of low 
margin (I e 78 74%) compared to the one in the high margin case (I e 2 6%) And 
because the yield rate has increased, even a slight decrease of 1 51% (for the low margin 
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case) and 0 06% (for the high margin case) in the core acquisition price will bring in 
enough remanufacturable cores 
Furthermore, as Figure 4 6 shows, when the average yield rate increases from 0 3 to 
0 55, in the high margin case, there will be a slight increase of 0 14% in the firm's profit 
and after that it almost stays constant This shows that when the profit margin is high, the 
change in the average yield rate will not affect the firm's profit that significantly 
However, in the low margin case, the firm can expect an increase of about 7% in his 
profit when the average yield rate increases from 0 3 to 0 55 
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We now analyze the impact of the standard deviation of the yield rate (a) on the 
expected optimal prices, quantities and profit of the firm We assume that ju is constant 
at 0 4 and we vary a from 0 04 to 0 16 As we see in Figure 4 7, all prices decrease with 
respect to a This includes the core acquisition prices in both high and low margin cases 
Reducing the acquisition price will decrease the number of core supply, but reducing the 
prices for new and remanufactured products should increase the demand for these 
products As we see in Figure 4 8, this is not necessarily the case for the new and 
remanufactured products For example, in the high margin case, when the price of the 
remanufactured product goes down, its sales quantity (or demand) decreases too Looking 
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at the profit margins for the new and remanufactured products in table 4 3, we observe 
that when a increases, the ratio of the profit margin of the remanufactured product to the 
one for the new product gets slightly larger, which means the remanufactured product 
becomes a little bit more attractive However, because in the high margin case, the new 
product has a higher profit margin than the remanufactured product, the firm will still be 
better off to sell more new products In addition, note that the core supply is decreasing 
which is in line with the decrease in the number of remanufactured products required to 
be produced 
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<x 
0 04 
0 07 
01 
013 
0 16 
Low margin 
Margin for 
new (A) 
15 000 
15 000 
14 997 
14 911 
14 465 
Margin for 
reman (B) 
42 032 
42 028 
42 018 
41 947 
41 621 
B/A 
2 802 
2 802 
2 802 
2 813 
2 877 
High margin 
Margin for 
new (C) 
215 000 
215 000 
214 991 
214 701 
213 205 
Margin for 
reman (D) 
176 173 
176 251 
176 361 
176 313 
175 444 
D/C 
0 819 
0 820 
0 820 
0 821 
0 823 
Table 4 3 Relative profit margins for new and remanufactured products in low and high 
margin cases with respect to a 
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Furthermore, in the low margin case, when the price of the new product goes down, its 
sales decrease too From Table 4 3, we observe that in the low margin case, the 
remanufactured is already the one with a higher profit margin and its relative profit 
margin versus the one for the new product gets even a bit larger with the increase in a, 
which makes the remanufactured product a little more attractive to sell As a result, we 
can explain that the decrease in the sale of the new product is caused by the extra increase 
in the sales of the remanufactured product which is more desirable to sell Also, note that 
in this case, the sales number for the remanufactured product is going up while the 
number of core supply is decreasing This can be explained by the fact that the supply 
constraint is not binding for these cases and a decrease in the core supply will not 
necessarily translate to a decrease in the number of remanufactured products sold 
Additionally, as we see in Figure 4 9, larger values of a will result in a decrease in 
the firm's profit in both high and low margin cases, and the changes are similar in both of 
these two cases The reduction in the profit is intuitive due to the additional uncertainty 
introduced to the model by increasing the standard deviation of the yield rate 
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4 2 4 Impact of the salvage value (s) 
To investigate the impact of the salvage value on the expected optimal values and 
profit of the firm, again, we assume two cases of high and low margin products by having 
lp = 500 and #> = 100 respectively We assume that £ = 0 6 , // = 0 4 and a = 0 1 Our 
analysis shows that when we change the salvage value from $7 to $17 per unit of product, 
there will not be any significant changes in the price of the new product As we see in 
Figure 4 10, the price of the remanufactured product will slightly decrease (I e less than 
2%) in the low margin case, and in the high margin case, it will decrease slightly when 
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the salvage value increases to a certain point, and it will increase slightly if the salvage 
value increases any further However, the core acquisition price increases significantly in 
both high (1 e 127 7%) and low (1 e 63 5%) margin cases This is due to the fact that 
when the salvage value for the cores increases, the potential loss from each extra core in 
the inventory decreases and it encourages the firm to acquire more number of cores by 
increasing the core acquisition price As Figure 4 11 shows, the firm will acquire 116 4% 
higher number of cores in the high margin case and 59 9% higher in the low margin case 
In addition, as we see in table 4 4, in the low margin case, since the remanufactured 
product has a higher profit margin, the firm will be better off to increase the sales of the 
remanufactured product and decrease the sales of the new product However, we find that 
in the high margin case, it will be optimal for the firm to increase the sales of the 
remanufactured product if the salvage value increases up to a certain point, and if it 
increases any further, it will be more profitable for the firm not to remanufacture the extra 
acquired cores and just to salvage them As a result, the quantity of the remanufactured 
products decreases for those higher salvage values Furthermore, the firm can expect a 
higher profit when the salvage value increases As we see in Figure 4 12, the increase in 
the firm's expected profit is higher in the low margin case (l e 42 67%) compared to the 
high margin (l e 121%) 
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Figure 4 10 Impact of the salvage value on the expected optimal prices 
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Salvage Value 
7 
9 
11 
13 
15 
17 
Low margin 
Margin for 
new (A) 
15 00 
15 00 
15 00 
15 00 
15 00 
15 00 
Margin for 
reman (B) 
34 27 
34 08 
33 89 
33 70 
33 51 
33 32 
B/A 
2 2848 
2 2721 
2 2595 
2 2469 
2 2342 
2 2216 
High margin 
Margin for 
new (C) 
214 99 
214 99 
214 99 
214 99 
214 99 
214 99 
Margin for 
reman (D) 
150 57 
149 95 
149 35 
149 31 
150 05 
151 00 
D/C 
0 7004 
0 6975 
0 6947 
0 6945 
0 6979 
0 7024 
Table 4 4 Relative profit margins for new and remanufactured products in low and high 
margin cases with respect to the salvage value (s) 
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4.3. Managerial Insight 
Our analysis shows that when the new and remanufactured products are perceived as 
closer substitutes, higher prices should be set for the remanufactured product and the core 
acquisition and the firm can expect a higher total profit In other words, if the firm can 
increase the consumers' relative WTP for the remanufactured product, she can improve 
her total profit, especially in the case of having a low margin product For example, 
additional marketing efforts could be considered to promote the remanufactured product 
and improve the consumers' perception of it versus the new product Making some 
changes in the original product designs so that they do not lose their value too quickly 
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(particularly by the time they get remanufactured) could also be considered In either 
case, the additional total profit must surpass the extra marketing and/or product design 
costs to keep it profitable 
In addition, we find that when the firm sells low margin products, if the average yield 
rate increases, there will be no need to change the price of the new product But the firm 
should charge a lower price for the remanufactured product to increase its sales This 
increase in sales will automatically decrease the sales for the new product, but it will still 
increase the firm's profit More specifically, the firm can expect an increase of about 7% 
in her profit when the average yield rate increases from 0 30 to 0 55 If the firm sells high 
profit margin products, there will almost be no need to change the prices and sales 
quantities with an increase in the average yield rate In other words, in the case of high 
profit margin, the change in the firm's profit will be negligible with respect to the average 
yield rate We also find that when the uncertainty in the yield rate increases (l e through 
increasing its standard deviation), the firm's profit will decrease in both high and low 
profit margin cases Furthermore, we show that the firm's profit will increase when the 
salvage value increases We also find that in the low profit margin case, the firm's profit 
is more sensitive to the changes in the salvage value Moreover, when the firm sells high 
margin products, if the salvage value is higher than a certain amount, it will be more 
profitable for the firm to reduce the number of remanufactured products and instead take 
advantage of salvaging the acquired cores In the next section, we conclude this chapter 
and provide some future research directions 
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4.4. Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
This chapter considers a firm that collects end of use/life cores and produces both new 
and remanufactured products The firm determines the optimal prices for the new and 
remanufactured product as well the core acquisition price We capture the quality of 
returns by assuming a stochastic collection yield rate and find the optimal expected prices 
and quantities in addition to the firm's expected profit We show how the competition 
between new and remanufactured products affects the optimal expected prices and 
quantities as well as the firm's expected profit In addition, we investigate the impacts of 
the yield rate and the salvage value on the optimal values and provide managerial insight 
on how the firm should set the optimal prices under different circumstances (with respect 
to the parameters under study) 
To extend the current research (in this chapter), a non-linear core supply function can 
be assumed In addition, the cases in which the yield rate can be affected by the 
acquisition price can be considered in the future Furthermore, different probability 
distribution functions can be used for the yield rate and their impacts on the optimal 
solutions can be investigated Finally, more complex models can be developed to capture 
joint pricing and inventory management decisions The latter is considered in chapter 5 
where the firm jointly determines the prices and lot sizes for the differentiated new and 
remanufactured products 
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CHAPTER 5 
PAPER 3: 
THE IMPACT OF DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND 
VERTICAL DIFFERENTIATION ON THE 
OPTIMAL REVERSE CHANNEL CHOICE 
71 
5.1. Model Description and Assumptions 
In this chapter, we model a manufacturer who produces both new and remanufactured 
products that are distinguishable from each other and sells them to the end-consumers 
directly She is faced with two options for collecting the end of use/life products (1 e 
cores) from consumers First, she can directly collect the cores from the consumers, 
inspect them and use the ones that are remanufacturable in remanufactunng This option 
is called the "Centralized Channel (C)" Second, she can let a third party take care of the 
collection and inspection This option is called the "Decentralized Channel (D)" Note 
that in the first option, the firm can have the cores at a lower cost per unit, but she will 
have to incur the cost of inspection and any associated costs related to the core 
acquisition including the possible loss from non-remanufacturable cores 
We model each of these options and find the optimal prices and lot sizes for the new 
and remanufactured products as well as the optimal core acquisition price and profits in 
the supply chain Note that in the centralized channel, the firm's profit is equal to the total 
supply chain profit (1 e the profit from selling new and remanufactured products) which 
includes both forward and reverse channels In the decentralized channel, the total profit 
is the sum of the firm's profit and the collector's profit We assume that the demands for 
new and remanufactured products are stochastic We define each demand as the 
summation of a deterministic part that is determined by prices and a random part which is 
independent of the prices A similar approach is used by Petruzzi and Dada (1999) to 
define the stochastic demand We also assume that the randomness in the demand for the 
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new product is independent of the randomness in the demand for the remanufactured 
product 
Following chapter 4, we assume that the supply of cores is a deterministic linear 
function of the acquisition price, Pa, paid to the end-consumers to return their used 
products The deterministic linear function takes the form S(Pa) = a + j3Pa, indicating 
that with an increase in the acquisition price, more cores will be expected to be collected, 
where a and /? are positive coefficients In addition, we look at the product as a single 
part that can be remanufactured and we do not consider multiple parts in our models 
After the cores are purchased, they have to go through a cleaning and inspection process 
We assume that this process costs c, per unit for the company The percentage of the 
parts that conform to the quality specifications is known as the yield rate and is denoted 
by r We assume an average yield rate level and later on we analyze how the changes in 
the yield rate would impact the optimal values Parts that are not remanufacturable or not 
remanufactured are salvaged (for example, sold to a material recycler) The unit salvage 
price is v per unit The salvage price is not dependent on the quality of parts to be 
recycled, but is proportional to the recyclable material content in the parts which is the 
same for a single part 
The firm sets the prices for new and remanufactured products to maximize her own 
profit as a monopoly, that is, we do not consider the competition with other companies to 
be able to focus on the main aspects of this research as explained earlier As it is observed 
in industries such as automotive parts, computer systems and office equipment, the 
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remanufactured products are distinguishable from the new products and they are priced 
lower than the new ones (Ferrer, 1997, Ayres et a l , 1997, Ferrer and Swaminathan, 
2010) In such cases, each consumer's willingness-to-pay (WTP) or valuation for the 
remanufactured product can be defined as a fraction (S) of their WTP for the new 
product (Ferguson and Toktay, 2006) In our models, we denote the market size by Mand 
it is an estimation of all potential consumers that could be reached by the firm We also 
show the maximum WTP of any consumer for any product (which obviously will be for 
the new product) by #> In addition, the consumers' WTP is distributed uniformly in the 
interval [0 ,^ ] and each consumer uses at most one unit Similar models are used in 
Ferguson and Toktay (2006) Table 5 1 summarizes the notation used in this chapter 
qn Number of new products to be stocked 
qr Number of remanufactured products to be stocked 
qa Number of cores to be acquired (l e supply of returns) 
P Price for the new product 
P Price for the remanufactured product 
P Unit acquisition price paid to the end-consumers 
DXP„, P ,£,) = D Demand for product type i (i = n (new), r (remanufactured)) 
y,(Pn>Pr) = y, The portion of the demand for product type i that changes 
with prices - for the new and remanufactured products (/ = 
n, r) 
st A random variable that captures randomness for the demand 
of the product type i and changes in the range [A, , 5, ] , with i 
= n,r 
Tl(Pn ,Pr,Pa,qn,qr) = H Profit function of the manufacturer/remanufacturer 
cn Unit cost of manufacturing the new product 
cr Unit cost of remanufacturing and stocking it for the period 
c, Unit cost of cleaning and inspection 
h: Unit disposal cost / salvage price for product type i (i = n, r) 
si Unit shortage cost for product type i (i = n, r) 
v Unit salvage value for the cores that are not remanufactured 
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8 The ratio of consumers' WTP for remanufactured products to 
their WTP for new products, S e (0,1) 
(p Maximum consumers' valuation of the new product 
r Yield rate 
/ , (s, ),FI(SI) p d f and c d f of the random variable s, (/ = n, r) 
Table 5 1 Notation 
The profit that each product brings in for the firm (without consideration of the core 
acquisition and any profit or loss associated with it) is defined as follows 
Prolit from the new product = Tl„ = < () 1) 
\P„D„-cnqn-s^Dn-qn\ D„>qn 
Profit from the remanufactured product = H = < r r r r r ' (5 2) 
\PrDr-crqr-sr(Dr-qr), Dr>qr 
We define Dn(P„,Pr,s„) = yn(P„,Pr) + £n and Dr(PH,P„e,) = yr(Pn,Pr) + er or in a 
shorter form Dn = yn + sn and Dr = yr + sr As we explain in Appendix A, yn and yr, 
which are the deterministic parts of the demand for the new and remanufactured products, 
can be determined in terms of the prices for the new and remanufactured products That 
is, yn = M X_A_-P. 
<p{\-8) 
and yr =M 
8P-P. 
n r Random variable st captures the 
randomness for the demand of the product type / and changes in the range [A, ,B:], with / 
= n, r denoting the new and remanufactured products respectively We also define 
zn = qn -yn and zr -qr -yr, which is consistent with Ernst (1970), Thowsen (1975) 
and Petruzzi and Dada (1999) Substituting these expressions in (1) and (2), we have 
75 
n \Pn(y„+ett)-cH{y„+z„)-K{z„-e„), en<zn 
„ \Pr(yr+£r)-Cf(yr+^r)-K(2r-er), Sr<Z, 
n = (5 4) {Pr(yr+^r)-cr(yr+zr)-sr(er-zr), er>zr 
This transformation of variables provides an alternative interpretation of the stocking 
decision That is, if the choice of z, is larger than the realized value of st, then leftovers 
occur for product type i If the choice of z, is smaller than the realized value of e,, then 
shortages occur for product type i The corresponding optimal stocking levels and pricing 
policy are to stock q*n =y„(P* ,P*) + z*„ units of the new product (to sell at the unit price 
P*) and q*r =y r(P* ,P*) + z* units of the remanufactured product (to sell at the unit price 
P*), where P*, P*, z* and z* maximize the expected profit of the firm In the next 
section, we analyze the option of the Centralized Channel 
5.2. Centralized Channel Models 
In this section, we assume that the firm collects the cores herself, and thus, we can 
define her total profit as follows 
Yl{Pn,Pr,Pa,zn,zr) = n „ +IIr +{qa -qr)v-qa(Pa + C / ) (5 5) 
Subject to qr < rqa (5 6) 
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As we explained earlier in this chapter, we define the core supply as a linear function 
of the acquisition price That is, qa = a + (3Pa Using a linear function for the core supply 
is reasonable for cases in which there are enough cores available to be acquired We aim 
to find the optimal values of P*, P', P*, z* and z* such that they maximize the 
expected profit of the firm To do this, first, we find the solution to the first order 
conditions If this solution satisfies the constraint, it will be the optimal solution If it does 
not satisfy the constraint, the optimal solution will be found by assuming that the 
constraint is binding and solving for the optimal values based on that Based on 
expressions (5 3), (5 4) and (5 5) above, the firm's expected profit is 
E(U) = [yn{y„ +u„)-hn{z„ -un)]f„(un)du„ + £[Pn(y„+ztt)-sH(u„ -zn)]f„(u„)dun + 
+ ^[Pr(yr+«r)-K(Zr "*01/>,)<&, + f' t^O, + Zr ) ~ ^  K ~ *,)]/, ("rW", ~ 
~cAy„ +zj-cr(yr+zr) + (qa -yr -zr)v-qa(Pa +c,) (5 7) 
Defining A(z,) = _[' (z, - u, )f, («, )du, and 0(z ;) = £ (u, - z,)/ («,)du, for i = n, r, 
similar to Petruzzi and Dada (1999), we can re-write expression (5 7) as follows 
£(n) = y / „ - Z „ + ^ - Z r + A (5 8) 
where 
y , = t f - c ( ) 0 / , + M ) > (59) 
Z(=(c,+/i()A(z() + (^+.s(-c()©(z() fon = », r (5 10) 
and 
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& = (<Ia-yr-Z,)V-<la(Pa+Cl) 
= (a + j3Pa-yr-zr)v-(a + j3Pa)(Pa+cI) (5 11) 
Expression (5 9) represents the riskless profit functions (Mills, 1959) related to the 
new and remanufactured products (l e without considering the core acquisition), which 
are the profits from the new and remanufactured products for a given set of prices in the 
equivalent problem in which en and sr are replaced by their mean values of /j,n and jur 
respectively Expression (5 10) shows the loss functions (Silver and Peterson, 1985), 
which assess an overage cost (ci +/?,) for each of the A(z,) expected leftovers when z, is 
too high, and an underage cost (P: +sl-ci) for each of the @(z;) expected shortages 
when z, is too low Expression (5 11) captures the profit or loss that the firm faces as a 
result of acquiring qa units of cores (which is the salvage value for the cores that are not 
remanufactured minus the collection and inspection costs) 
The objective is to maximize the expected profit of the firm by finding the optimal 
prices and lot sizes for the new and remanufactured products We have 
E(Tl) = (Pn-cn)(M 
+ (Pr-cr)(M 
P -P 
i n r + Mn)-(cn+hn)An(zn)-(Pn +sn -c „ )©„(z„ ) 
SP*-P. 
+ (a + j3Pa-M 
pSQ - 8) 
SP„ - P. 
+ Mr)~(cr +hr)Ar(zr)-(Pr +sr -cr)&r(zr) 
n r 
y5(\-5) 
-zr)v-(a + j3Pa)(Pa+c,) 
In Appendix D, we show that the Hessian matrix for £'(11) is negative semidefinite 
and thus, the expected profit function for the firm is strictly concave with respect to the 
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model variables and the solution to the first order conditions maximizes the expected 
profit In addition, the expected profit is concave in Pn, Pr and Pa for any given set of 
zn and zr (see Appendix D for details) Thus, it is possible to reduce this optimization 
problem to one over zn and zr Assuming that the solution to the first order conditions 
satisfies the model constraint (1 e constraint (5 6)), first, we find the optimal values of 
P*, P* and P* for each set zn and zr Then, we substitute these optimal values in 
£•(11) and find the optimal values of z* and z* that maximize E(Yl) As a result, we 
have 
8E(U) 
3P„ 
: 0 => -2MPn + 2MPr + Mcn -Mcr -Mv + [M + nn - 0„ (z„)]^(1 - 5) = 0 ( 5 \2) 
^ ^ - = 0 => 2SMPn -2MPr -5Mcn + Mcr + Mv + [pr -®r(zr)]pS(l -S) = 0 (513) 
Solving equations (12) and (13) for Pn and Pr, we have 
2 2M 2M 
p. = cr +v + Sp | (fiH+fir)Sp [ 0 „ ( z J + 0 r ( z f ) ] ^ 
2 2M 2M 
In addition, to find the optimal acquisition price, we have 
®£!± = /3v-a-/3c1-2/3Pa=0=* 
oP„ 
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Bv-a-Bc, v-c. a 
'•" 2* ""I^V (516) 
Note that when constraint (5 6) is not binding, the acquisition price is determined 
independently from zn and zr In addition, if the firm were nskless, then &n(zn) = 0 
and ©,(z ) = 0 resulting in the optimal nskless prices P° =——— + ^-JL ^v_z_
 a n ( j 
2 2M 
0 c +v + 5q> (u+u )dlp Pr = — 1 - Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 summarize these results 
2 2M 
Lemma 1 For a fixed set of zn and zr, the optimal prices for new and remanufactured 
products are determined uniquely as functions of zn and zr 
2M 
P'-P(Z ;)-P° \.&M + &r('r)W 
Lemma 2 The optimal acquisition price does not depend on zn and zr 
2 2/3 
Since both &„(zn) and ®r(zr) are nonnegative, P* < P° and P* < P° That is, 
when there is uncertainty in the demands, the firm will set lower prices than the nskless 
ones Now, we substitute P* and P* in £ ( n ) , and then maximize E(Y1) with respect to 
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zn and zr Theorem 1 shows that depending on the parameters of the problem, E(Yl) 
might have different points that satisfy the first order conditions 
Theorem 1 The single period optimal stocking and pricing policy is to stock 
qn ~ yn (P* ,P*) + z* units of new products to be sold at the unit price P* and 
q*r = yr (P* ,P*) + z* units of remanufactured products to be sold at the unit price P*, 
and to pay the unit price P* for each core acquired, where P*, P* and P*a are specified 
by Lemma 1, and z* and z* are determined as follows 
(a) Assuming that F„() is a distribution function that either satisfies 
^ £ ^ > - 3 / „ ( z „ ) r ( z „ ) or %j^- < - 3 / „ ( z > ( z J (. e only one could happen for 
& „ 8zn 
different values of zn in the region [An,Bn]), and Fr() is a distribution function that 
either satisfies &&1 > -fr (zr )r{zr) or $A^A < -fr (zr )r(zr) where r( ) - ^ ) dzr JrK " v " dzr Jry ry x " v / I-F() 
is defined as the hazard rate, when sufficient conditions 
9
 (4M„-2A„-SAr) + -^--c„+sn>—]—(cr+v) 2M " r 2 (1-£) " " 2 (1-£) 
and 
^-[M + An +Ar] + sr >-(cr + v) 2 M L " rl r 2 
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are met, then z* is the largest z in the region \ A„,B 1 that satisfies = 0, and z* 
is the largest zr in the region [ Ar, Br ] that satisfies = 0, and they are unique 
dz. 
(b) If F() is an arbitrary distribution function that does not fit into the description in 
(a), then an exhaustive search over all values of zn and zr in the regions [An, Bn] and 
[Ar, Br] respectively will determine z* and z* 
Proof See Appendix E 
The above lemmas and the theorem hold for the case in which the solution to the first 
order conditions satisfies constraint (5 6) When the solution to the first order conditions 
does not satisfy the constraint, the optimal solution can be found where the constraint is 
binding So, we have 
qr =rqa=>M 8P.-P. ft v 
lp8{\ - S) + zr =r(a + j3Pa) 
5P„ - P. 
n r 
yS(\ - 8) 
z„ -ra 
rj3 (5 17) 
Substituting Pa in E(Yi), we have 
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£(n) = (/>„-o(M 
SP-P. 
1 P.-P. + Mj~(cn + h„)A„(zn)-(Pn +sn - c „ ) 0 „ ( 2 J 
+ (Pr-cr)(M 
SP-P 
pS(l-8) 
+ fir)-{cr + hr)Ar(zr)-(Pr +sr -cr)Gr(zr) (5 18) 
p5(l - 8) 
\-r 1 
r r 
M + z„ 
M 
r(3 
SP-P 
n r 
Tp8{\ - 8) 
zr -ra 
+ — + c, 
rp 
In Appendix F, we show that the Hessian matrix for £(11) is negative semidefinite 
and thus, the expected profit function for the firm is strictly concave and the solution to 
the first order conditions maximizes the expected profit As a result, we can use a similar 
procedure as we used for the case of non-binding constraint to find the optimal solution 
First, we need to find the optimal values of P* and P* for each set zn and zr Then, we 
substitute these optimal values in E(J\) and find the optimal values of z* and z* that 
maximize £(11) To find the optimal values of P*n and P*, we have to solve the first 
order conditions with respect to Pn and Pr After some simplifications we have 
p . =(.<P+c„>2 
—\fiv -0c,+ a\\ - p6{\ -£)> + — ["„ + 8^ir] 
~[®.M+^r^r)] 
(5 19) 
If we define 
po = (<P+cn)r | 
2pS(\ -syp [Pv-pc,+ a][\ -y8(\ - <?)]r + — [//„ + 8jur] as the 2M 
optimal nskless prices, we can re-write P* as follows 
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^>^-f^k(0 + *UO] (5 20) 
^ p 1 \2S(\-S)M2Pn°+cp2S2(\-S)2r2j3[M + M„+Mr] 
r
 2(1 -S)M\p6(l-S)r2/3 + M\\+pS(l-S)2r2/3M(cr + v) - (J3v - J3c, +a)[p(\-5)-lfi-M 
+ g[(l-,')0„(z,) + (l-^)0,(z,)]+ hJSi'-Sn u\'r 2 [q>S(\-S)r (3 + M\ 
If we define 
^ o , 1 \2S(\-S)M2Pn0+<p252(\-S)2r2j3[M + M„+Mr] 1 
r
 2{\-5)M\p5{\-S)r2 fi + M\[+p8{\-5)2r2 f3M(cr+v)-(Pv- pct +a)[y{\-5)-\^rM) 
as the optimal riskless prices, we can re-write P* as follows 
We observe that if zr > 0, then P* > Pr° This shows that in the case of having a 
binding constraint, we could have P* > P° which was not the case for the case of non-
binding constraint That is, the firm sets a higher optimal price for the remanufactured 
product compared to a riskless firm This is reasonable due to the fact that when the 
constraint is binding, it shows that the number of available cores is limited (l e all 
remanufacturable cores are to be remanufactured) or to acquire more cores, a higher 
acquisition price needs to be paid to the consumers (which may not be ideal for the firm) 
As a result, the firm sets a higher price for the remanufactured product to reduce its 
demand (which could reduce possible shortage costs or additional core acquisition costs 
if the shortage is to be avoided) Depending on the model parameters and functions 
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®„(z„) a r ,d ®r(zr)' f° r s o m e negative values of zr we could have P* < P° However, 
the optimal price charged for the new product is lower than the one charged by a riskless 
firm(ie P;<P°) 
To find the final optimal values in terms of zn and zr, we need to substitute the price 
values in (20) and (21) in equation (18) for the expected profit of the firm and solve 
8E(U)
 n _, dE(U) n 0 , , , _, c 
= 0 and = 0 Since we cannot have a simple closed-form solution at this 
dzn dzr 
point, we will further analyze this part using a numerical analysis that is explained in 
section 5 4 Next, we explain the models for the Decentralized Channel in which the core 
collection is done by a third party known as the collector 
5.3. Decentral ized Channel Models 
In the decentralized channel, there is a third party who collects cores from the 
consumers by paying an acquisition price Pa Then, he inspects the cores and sells the 
remanufacturable ones to the firm (who is in charge of manufacturing new products and 
remanufacturing) for a unit price w The firm sets the optimal prices and the production 
lot sizes for the new and remanufactured products Since we assume that each 
remanufactured product consists of one unit of remanufacturable core, the order size that 
the firm places to the collector is equal to the production lot size of the remanufacturing 
(l e qr) We can define the firms expected profit (I e E(Y1M)) and the collector's 
expected profit (I e E(Ylc)) as follows 
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E(UM) = (P„-cn)(M 1 + M„)-(c/,+K)A„(z„)-(P„ +sn -cn)®n{zn) 
+ (Pr-cr-w)(M SPn-Pr pd{\ - 8) 
(5 22) 
+ Mr)-(cr + w + hr)Ar(zr)-(Pr +sr -cr -w)®r(zr) 
E(Uc) = wqr+(a + /3Pa-qr)v-(a + j3Pa)(Pa+c1) (5 23) 
Since qr =yr+zr -M 5P.-P. n r 
pS(\-S) + zr, we have 
E(UL) = w(M SP„ - P. n r 
<pS(\ - 5) + Zr
) + (a + j3Pa-M SP-P, n r 
7p5{\-S) -zr)v-{a + pPa){Pa+c,) 
In Appendix G, we show that the Hessian matrix for E(JlM) is negative semidefinite 
and thus, the expected profit function for the firm is strictly concave and the solution to 
the first order conditions maximizes the expected profit The first order conditions are 
dE(UM) 
dP. 
• = 0 => -2MPn +2MPr +Mcn -Mcr -Mw + [M + ^n - 0 B ( z J ] ^ ( l -S) - 0 (5 24) 
dE(UM) 
dP. 
= 0 => 2SMPn -2MPr -SMcn + Mcr +Mw + [{ir-®r(zr)]pS(l~S) = 0 (5 25) 
Solving equations (5 24) and (5 25) for Pn and Pr, we have 
p. _cn+(p [ (ji„+5/4r)<p [®H(zH) + S&r(zr)]<p 
2M 2M 
(5 26) 
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p, ^cr+w + 5p | (jun+/ur)5p [Qn(z„) + er(zr)]S<p 
2M 2M 
(5 27) 
qr = — 
M 
p5(l-5)l 2 
Sc-c-w 
n r 
25 [",-©,(*,)]+*, (5 28) 
We also know that the collector has to provide the number of remanufacturable cores 
requested by the firm That is, for any order of the size qr, the collector needs to collect 
qa=^L Thus,wehave qa = a + j3Pa => ^ = a + pPa => Pa = ^ - - => 
r r rp p 
Qr a \ \ M 
•P P rp\q>5(1-5) 
Sc„ 
•c-w £k-e,(z,)]+,, - | (5 29) 
Substituting qr and Pa from (5 28) and (5 29) in equation (5 23), and solving 
dE(Uc ) 
dw 
0, we find the optimal price for each core that the collector charges the firm 
as follows 
w' =(5cn-cr) + p5(\-5) 
M 
+ -
1 + - M 
2r2pp5(\ - 5) 
J_ 
2r 
a 
' P 
&n~Cr 
2r2p5 
\jur-@r(zr)] + 
r P 
(5 30) 
We can also re-write equation (5 30) as follows 
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w = w + 
Tp8{\ - 8) 
M 
+ • 
1 
r2/? + — M 
W<)
 =(&n-Cr)-
9<\-8) 
2M -Mr — 
2p8(l - 8) 
1 
z
'
+
^
0
'
( z
' > 
where 
1 + - M 
2rzpy5(\-S) 
2r 
(1 - r)v - Cj + + 
&n~Cr 1 
+ -2r2j3S Mr 
and w° is the riskless price that the collector would charge the firm for each 
remanufacturable core We observe that if — 0 (z )>—z , then w* >w° Otherwise, 
28 
w* < w° Considering w*, the firm will order 
M 
p8(\-8) 
8c 
n r c. -w 
— \jur -®r(zr)] + zr units of cores Next, we substitute 28 
w* from equation (30) in equation (27) to find P*r in terms of the model parameters and 
zn and zr Finally, we calculate the optimal zn and zr (l e z* and z*) that maximize 
the firm's expected profit and find optimal values of the model variables (l e optimal 
prices and lot sizes) based on z* and z* Since we cannot have a simple closed-form 
solution at this point, we will further analyze the decentralized channel models using a 
numerical analysis In addition, we analyze the impact of some of the model parameters 
on the optimal prices and quantities, and the expected profit of the firm 
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5.4. Numerical Analysis 
In this section, we further analyze the models and the optimal values for both 
centralized and decentralized channels First, we provide the set of parameters that we 
use for the numerical analysis Next, we analyze the impact of consumers' perception of 
the remanufactured product versus new and the collection yield rate on the optimal 
solutions In addition, we investigate how the centralized and decentralized channels 
compare with each other under different conditions Furthermore, we show numerically 
how the demand uncertainty changes the optimal values of the models 
5 4 1 Parameter Setting and Optimization Procedure 
The original sets of parameter values that we considered for our extensive numerical 
analysis include cn= {50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85, 90}, c= {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 
40}, c, = {3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15}, h„={-55, -45, -35, -25, -15}, h = {-10, -8, -6, -4, -2}, 
sn= {8, 10, 12, 14, 16}, sr= {3, 5, 7, 9, 11}, v= {20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50}, a = {5, 
10, 15, 20}, p = {15, 20, 25, 30, 35}, p = {500, 800, 1100, 1400}, M = {500, 1000, 
1500, 2000, 2500, 3000} However, since the results are consistent across these sets of 
values, we present our results based on the specific set of values for the model parameters 
as follows 
c„=70, cr=\5, 0, = 5 , h„ = - 3 5 , hr = - 1 0 , sn =12 , sr = 3 , v = 30, A„ =-100 and-5, 
Ar =-100 and-5, Bn =5 and 100, Br =5 and 100, a = 5, J3 = 20, ^ = 500, M = 500, 
£ = 0 2,0 25,0 3, , 0 97, r =0 1, ,0 9, 
sn ~Umform[An,Bn] and er ~Uniform[Ar,Br] 
These values make it possible to find feasible solutions for a large range of parameters 
such as 5 and r, and they are reasonable from a practical For example, the unit cost of 
89 
remanufacturing (cr) is assumed to be small enough compared to the unit cost of 
manufacturing new products (c„) to make the remanufacturing a viable option This is 
also consistent with the data sets used in the literature (for example, see Bakal and 
Akcali, 2006) To make the process of finding the optimal solutions more 
straightforward, we use Excel Solver to find the optimal zn and z r , and the optimal 
prices that maximize the firm's expected profit In addition, we use some of the equations 
presented earlier in sections 5 2 and 5 3 to define how the variables and parameters are 
related to each other in our models Below we analyze the impact of different values of 8 
and the yield rate on the optimal solutions and we compare the centralized and 
decentralized channels under different circumstances 
5 4 2 Impact of consumers' relative WTP for the remanufactured product ( 8 ) and 
the yield rate 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, when consumers perceive the new and 
remanufactured products as closer substitutes, 8 takes a higher value Analyzing the 
impact of 8 on the profits in the centralized and decentralized channels, we find that 
depending on the yield rate level, 8 can have different impacts on the optimal values 
When the yield rate is high, in both centralized and decentralized channels, the firm's 
profit decreases slightly (l e for less than 1%) when 8 increases to a certain value (l e 
around 0 65 in our experiment), and when 8 increases any further (up to 0 97 in our 
experiment), the firm's profit increases for about 7 5% in the centralized channel and 
1 5% in the decentralized one This is due to the fact that when 8 is higher, the 
remanufactured product becomes a closer substitute for the new product and as a result, 
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the firm's profit from the new product diminishes while her profit from the 
remanufactured products increases If we increase 8 from a very low value (such as 
5 = 0 2) to a certain value (such as 8 = 0 65 in our experiment), the decrease in the 
profit of the new product will be higher than the increase in the profit of the 
remanufactunng, and thus, the firm's total profit will decrease But when we increase the 
value of 5 further, the profit of the remanufactunng takes a sharper increase that is 
higher than the reduction in the profit from the new products, which will result in an 
increase in the firm's total profit Note that the increase in the firm's total profit in the 
centralized channel is observed to be higher than the one in the decentralized channel 
when S takes a value higher than a certain value which is explained above 
When the yield rate is low, in the centralized channel, increasing 5 changes the firm's 
profit in a similar way as in the case of high yield rate above The only difference is that 
when the firm's profit increases with respect to 5, it only increases for less than 1% 
compared to 7 5% in the case of having a high yield rate This is reasonable because in 
the case of a low yield rate, the unit cost for each remanufacturable core is higher and as 
a result the remanufactured product is not as profitable as it was in the case of a high 
yield rate Thus, the firm will not see an increase in her profit as she would in the case of 
a high yield rate In addition, when the yield rate is low, in the decentralized channel, the 
firm's profit only decreases when S takes a higher value This is due to the fact that in 
the centralized channel, the firm could gain some revenue form salvaging the extra cores 
that were not remanufactured or remanufacturable, and this revenue could cover some the 
additional costs of acquiring remanufacturable cores But in the decentralized channel, 
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this revenue in obtained by the collector and as a result, the increase in the firm's profit 
from remanufactunng does not surpass the decrease in the firm's profit from the new 
products, and the firm's total profit decreases with respect to S 
To compare the centralized (C) and decentralized (D) channels, we consider the 
centralized channel as the benchmark and investigate the impacts of switching from the 
centralized channel to the decentralized one on the optimal prices, lot sizes, and the 
profits Table 5 2 summarizes the result of our analysis Since we did not find any 
significant changes in the optimal price and the leftover and shortage costs of the new 
product, we excluded them from this table Note that we do not consider the firm's 
decision on which channel to choose What we analyze here is that under what conditions 
it will be less harmful (or more beneficial) to the firm if she chooses a decentralized 
channel over a centralized one As a result, not considering a fixed cost for the core 
collection does not change our results and just shifts the numbers to be more in favor of 
the centralized channel As we see in part (a), when the remanufactured product is 
perceived as a closer substitute for the new product (1 e <5 is higher) and the yield rate is 
low, it will be more advantageous to the firm to operate in a centralized channel Under 
these conditions (1 e having a high d and a low yield rate), a decentralized channel could 
reduce the firm's profit for about 7 56%, which is higher than the reduction that could 
happen under other circumstances But if the yield rate is low and the consumers do not 
perceive the remanufactured product as a close substitute to the new product, it will be 
less detrimental to the firm's profit to switch to the decentralized channel In addition, we 
observe that the change in the yield rate from low to high does not have much impact on 
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the firm's profit (for switching from C to D), but the consumer's perception has a higher 
effect 
Furthermore, in part (b) of Table 5 2, we show that how the total supply chain's profit 
(which in the centralized channel it is equal to the firm's profit) would change if a 
decentralized channel were chosen over the centralized one We observe that the supply 
chain will experience the highest reduction in total profit when the remanufactured 
product is perceived poorly by the consumers (1 e <5 is low) and the yield rate is high 
We also find that when the yield rate is low and 8 is high, the total supply chain's profit 
will have the least reduction (if the decentralized channel is chosen over the centralized) 
As we explained earlier in part (a) of the table, having a low yield rate and a high 5 are 
the conditions under which the firm will face a highest reduction in her profit by 
switching to the decentralized channel This means that if switching to the decentralized 
channel happens under these conditions, the firm will need to be compensated for the 
extra loss This could be done through appropriate contracts that are not within the focus 
of this research In part (c) of the table, we observe that the firm's leftover costs for the 
remanufactured products increase 3 to 9 folded depending on the level of the yield rate 
and S When the yield rate is low and the products are perceived as closer substitutes, 
switching to the decentralized channel will cause the firm the highest increase in the 
leftover costs of the remanufactured products (l e almost 9 times) In contrary, when the 
yield rate is low and the remanufactured product is poorly perceived by the consumers 
(I e 5 is low), the increase in the leftover costs of the remanufactured products will be 
the smallest 
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(a) Change in the Firm's profit when 
switching f rom C to D channel 
Delta High = 09 
Low = 03 
-7 56% 
-6 15% 
-7 2 2 % 
-6 2 0 % 
Low = 0 1 High = 09 
Yield rate 
(c) Change in the Firm's Leftover cost for 
reman w h e n switching f rom C to D 
channel 
Delta High = 09 
Low = 03 
(e) Change in the F 
for the new produc 
from C to D channi 
Delta High = 09 
Low = 0 3 
(g) Change in the F 
for the reman prod 
from C to D chanm 
Delta High = 09 
Low = 0 3 
883 95% 
371 0 7 % 
554 50% 
461 8 7 % 
Low = 0 1 High = 09 
Yield rate 
irm's optimal lot size 
t w h e n switching 
3l 
2 6 1 % 
-0 2 4 % 
10 2 0 % 
-0 24% 
Low = 0 1 High = 09 
Yield rate 
irm's optimal Price 
uct when switching 
3l 
0 19% 
0 2 0 % 
0 50% 
0 2 1 % 
Low=0 1 High = 09 
Yield rate 
(b) Change in the Total profit of the chain 
when switching f rom C to D channel 
Delta High = 09 
Low = 03 
-0 5 9 % 
-1 5 1 % 
-2 18% 
-6 0 3 % 
Low = 0 1 High = 0 9 
Yield rate 
(d) Change in the Firm's Shortage cost 
for reman w h e n switching from C to D 
channel 
Delta High = 09 
Low = 03 
-0 7 0 % 
-78 3 9 % 
73 6 3 % 
-81 3 1 % 
Low = 0 1 High = 09 
Yield rate 
(f) Change in the Firm's optimal lot size 
for the reman product when switching 
f rom C to D channel 
Delta High = 09 
Low = 0 3 
-27 8 3 % 
440 3 0 % 
-16 14% 
464 06% 
Low = 0 1 High = 09 
Yield rate 
(h) Change in the Number of acquired 
cores when switching f rom C to D 
channel 
Delta High = 09 
Low = 03 
-27 8 3 % 
-44 2 0 % 
-56 4 6 % 
-93 5 3 % 
Low = 01 High = 09 
Yield rate 
Table 5 2 Impacts of switching from a Centralized (C) channel to Decentralized (D) 
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In part (d) of the table, we find that when the yield rate is high and the remanufactured 
product is not perceived as a close substitute to the new product (1 e 8 is low), switching 
to the decentralized channel will reduce the firm's shortage cost for the remanufactured 
products by around 81% But, if the yield rate and 8 are both high, the firm's shortage 
cost will go up by around 73% In addition, as we see in parts (e) and (f) of the table, the 
firm's optimal lot size will increase if 8 is high and it will stay almost the same (i e with 
a slight decrease of 0 24%) if 8 is low The opposite is true for the firm's optimal lot size 
for the remanufactured product When 8 is high, the firm's optimal lot size for the 
remanufactured product decreases and its highest reduction happens when the yield rate 
is low (I e for about 28%) Also, when 8 is low, this optimal lot size becomes more than 
4 times larger 
As we mentioned earlier, the optimal price for the new product does not change 
significantly We can also see in part (g) of Table 5 2 that the optimal price of the 
remanufactured product increases slightly with the highest increase happening when both 
the yield rate and 8 are high (I e for 0 5%) Finally, in part (h) of the table, we find that 
the optimal number of acquired cores decreases when the decentralized channel is chosen 
over the centralized The highest reduction occurs when the yield rate is high, but the 
remanufactured product is perceived poorly by the consumers (l e 8 is low) 
5 4 3 Impact of new and remanufactured product demand uncertainty 
For this part, we assumed four different combinations for the demand uncertainties of 
the new and remanufactured products In the first one, the randomness in demands of the 
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new and remanufactured products can change in smaller ranges, that is, the demand for 
each type of product is less uncertain since the variance for the randomness is smaller 
More specifically, we assume that An = -5, Bn = 5, Ar = -5 and Br =5 In the second 
case,^4n =-5, Bn=5, Ar--\00 and 5^=100, which means the demand for the 
remanufactured product is more uncertain while the demand for the new product is more 
certain In the third case, An =-100, Bn =100, Ar =-5 and Br =5, which implies the 
opposite of the situation in the second case, that is, the demand for the new product is 
more uncertain while the remanufactured product has a more certain demand Finally, in 
the fourth case, An =-100, B„= 100, Ar =-100 and Br =100, which indicates that both 
products have very uncertain demands We consider the first case as the benchmark and 
investigate how the optimal solution changes when we change the demand uncertainties 
to the ones in any of the other three cases Note that the magnitude of the change in most 
cases depends on the model parameters, but the direction of the changes (l e increase or 
reduction) is reasonable to be considered in our analysis We also consider two cases of 
model parameters under which we could have binding and non-binding constraints (for 
the centralized channel) In the following, we present the results for both of these cases 
In both centralized and decentralized channels, when the uncertainty in any type of 
product increases, the total profit decreases We observe that the amount of reduction is 
similar between centralized and decentralized channels In addition, as we expected, the 
reduction in the total profit is the highest in the fourth case where the demand 
uncertainties for both new and remanufactured products are higher However, we find 
that when the uncertainties are higher, the reduction in the firm's profit is slightly less in 
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the centralized channel compared to the decentralized one (1 e 2-3% lower reduction in 
the firm's profit in the centralized channel in our experiments) Since in the centralized 
channel the firm makes all the decisions on the optimal prices and lot sizes, she could 
reduce the amount of loss that she has to incur due to higher uncertainties But in the 
decentralized channel, the firm does not determine the optimal acquisition price and as 
result, the collector's decision will not necessarily be the best for the firm when reacting 
to higher uncertainties 
Regarding the optimal prices, as we noted in the analytical parts of sections 5 2 and 
5 3, the firm will set lower prices for the new product in both centralized and 
decentralized channels, and a lower price for the remanufactured product in the 
centralized channel when the uncertainty in the demand for the new and/or 
remanufactured product is higher In the decentralized channel, when the uncertainty in 
the demand for the new product is higher, the firm sets a lower price for the 
remanufactured product, but she sets a higher price for the remanufactured product only 
when the uncertainty in the demand of the remanufactured product is higher She sets a 
higher price in this case because the higher uncertainty in the demand of the 
remanufactured product increases the unit core price that the collector charges the firm, 
and as a result, the firm has to charge a higher price This is consistent with the analytical 
results in section 5 3 
In addition, in the centralized channel, when the constraint is not binding, the optimal 
core acquisition price and, as a result, the optimal number of acquired cores do not 
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depend on any demand uncertainties We also observe in this case that the optimal lot 
sizes for the new and remanufactured products are set higher only when the uncertainty in 
their respective demand increases Furthermore, we observe that in the case of having a 
decentralized channel, the uncertainty in the demand of the new product does not have 
any impact on the optimal core acquisition price A larger lot size is set for the new 
product when the uncertainty in its demand is higher But the uncertainty in the demand 
of the remanufactured product does not have any impact on this lot size In the 
centralized channel, when the constraint is binding, a smaller optimal core acquisition 
price is set with a higher uncertainty in the demand of the new product Also in this case, 
when the uncertainty in the demand of the new product increases, the optimal lot size for 
the remanufactured product is reduced, but a larger lot size is set for the new product 
when the uncertainty in the new and/or remanufactured product is higher It can be shown 
analytically that all these results hold independent of the model parameters 
We also find that the leftover and shortage costs for the new and remanufactured 
products increase significantly only when the uncertainty in their respective demands 
increase However, when the uncertainty in the demand of the other product increases, it 
changes the leftover and shortage costs slightly This is because of the fact that the higher 
uncertainty in the demand of the other product changes the optimal prices for both new 
and remanufactured products and thus it changes the optimal zn and zr which 
consequently affect the leftover and shortage costs In the next section, we provide some 
managerial insight based on the results of our analysis 
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5.4. Managerial Insight 
Our findings show that in both centralized and decentralized channels, when the 
uncertainty in the demand of any of the two products increases, the total profit decreases 
(as expected), but, we do not see any significant difference between centralized and 
decentralized channels in the amount of reduction in their total profit We also observe 
that when the uncertainties are higher, the reduction in the firm's profit is about 2-3% less 
in the centralized channel compared to the decentralized one In addition, the firm should 
set lower optimal prices for the new and remanufactured products in both centralized and 
decentralized channels when the uncertainties in the demands of the new and 
remanufactured products increase, except for the remanufactured product in the 
decentralized channel for which the firm sets a higher price when facing a higher 
uncertainty in the demand of the remanufactured product 
We also observe that the leftover and shortage costs for the new and remanufactured 
products increase significantly only when the uncertainty in their respective demands 
increase However, when the uncertainty in the demand of the other product increases, it 
changes the leftover and shortage costs slightly Furthermore, depending on the 
consumers' perception of the remanufactured product versus new and the yield rate for 
the core collection, switching from the centralized channel to a decentralized one, could 
have different impacts on the optimal prices, quantities and profits For example, if the 
yield rate is low and the consumers do not perceive the remanufactured product as a close 
substitute to the new product, it will be less detrimental or more beneficial (in the case 
that the decentralized channel is more profitable with the consideration of the fixed costs 
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of the core collection) to the firm's profit to switch to the decentralized channel But if 
the yield rate is low and the consumers perceive the products as close substitutes, it will 
be the least desirable condition to the firm to switch from a centralized channel to a 
decentralized one Next, we conclude this chapter and present possible future research 
directions 
5.5. Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
In this chapter, we consider a firm that produces distinguishable new and 
remanufactured products with uncertainty in the demands She has the option of 
collecting the cores herself in a centralized channel or using a third party collector to 
provide her with any number of remanufacturable cores as she may require in a 
decentralized channel In each channel, we jointly find the optimal prices and lot sizes for 
the new and remanufactured products as well as the optimal core acquisition price that 
needs to be paid to the consumers to return their end of life/use products We investigate 
the impact of uncertainties in the demands of the new and remanufactured products on 
the optimal prices, lot sizes and profits in each channel 
The current study has assumed a single period model for a product that already exists 
in the market and the market for such a product is mature enough to allow for the new 
and remanufactured products to co-exist in the market while there are enough end of 
life/use products available for collection Multi-period and infinite-horizon joint pricing 
and inventory management could be considered as an extension in the future research 
This will extensively add to the complexity of the models, but it could capture the impact 
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of the decisions in one period on the optimal policies in the future periods In addition, 
the impact of the OEM's initial decisions for the price and lot size of the new product 
(when the product is just introduced to the market) on the future optimal prices and lot 
sizes of the new and remanufactured products could also be taken into account in a multi-
period modeling structure 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
DIRECTIONS 
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Pricing and structural decisions for differentiated new and remanufactured products 
(that are sold in the same market) have not been well addressed in the literature 
Examples of such products are computer systems, automotive parts and office equipment 
Most of the existing literature deals with new and remanufactured products that are not 
distinguishable by the consumers, that is, they are assumed to be perfect substitutes, and 
as a result, the same price can be set for both products However, in this thesis, we model 
different levels of competition (substitution) between new and remanufactured products 
by considering the relative willingness to pay of the consumers for the remanufactured 
product versus new This thesis consists of three research papers 
In the first paper, we take into account a retailer that sells vertically differentiated new 
and remanufactured products More specifically, we consider the cases in which the new 
and remanufactured products are produced by separate firms (1 e the manufacturer and 
the remanufacturer respectively) The problem here is whether it is better that the retailer 
collaborates more closely (be coordinated) with the manufacturer or the remanufacturer 
Note that we assume that when two members of the supply chain are coordinated with 
each other, they determine the retail price for the respective product as a joint unit For 
example, if the retailer and the manufacturer are coordinated, they jointly define the 
optimal retail price for the new product We find which coordination structure performs 
better in terms of the total CLSC profit In addition, we analyze different conditions 
under which any of the structures would lead some of the CLSC members out of 
business Finally, we do a more detailed analysis under conditions where all members of 
the supply chain exist in the market More specifically, we analyze the impacts of the 
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consumers' perception of the remanufactured product versus new (1 e the level of 
competition or substitution between products) and the quality of returns on the optimal 
pricing and structural decisions 
To extend the research in the first paper, in the second paper, we consider business 
cases in which one firm produces both new and remanufactured products (which are 
distinguishable) and sells them to the same market As a result, the firm is to determine 
the optimal prices for both products In addition, we include the decision making for the 
acquisition price that the firm needs to pay to collect the end of life or end of use products 
(known as the core acquisition price) We find these three prices simultaneously and 
investigate the impacts of some of the model parameters on the expected optimal prices 
and quantities for both products, and the expected profit of the firm The parameters 
under study include the competition between new and remanufactured products (which is 
captured by the consumers' willingness to pay for the remanufactured product versus 
new), quality of returns (which is modeled by the stochastic core collection yield rate), 
and the salvage value of the cores that are not remanufactured or remanufacturable 
Furthermore, we compare the cases in which the firms deal with high profit margin 
products versus low profit margin ones We show how the optimal decisions could be 
different for high versus low margin products under different conditions 
In both the first and second papers, we assumed deterministic demand functions for 
the new and remanufactured products But, in the third paper, we extend our models by 
assuming stochastic demand functions for the new and remanufactured products while 
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they are still influenced by the product prices Another extension in this paper is that we 
develop models to jointly find the optimal prices and lot sizes for differentiated new and 
remanufactured products Similar to the second paper, we consider a firm who produces 
distinguishable new and remanufactured products and sells them to the same market In 
addition, we investigate two types of reverse channels for the core collection In the first 
channel, which is called centralized, the firm collects the cores directly from the 
consumers Thus, she needs to determine the optimal core acquisition price in addition to 
the optimal prices and lot sizes for the new and remanufactured products In the second 
channel, which is called decentralized, a separate third party collects the cores and sells 
them to the firm as required As a result, the optimal core acquisition price is determined 
by the third party collector, and the firm sets the optimal prices and lot sizes for the new 
and remanufactured products We find the impacts of some of the model parameters, such 
as the competition between the products, the quality of returns (1 e the core collection 
yield rate) and the level of uncertainty in the demand of each product, on the optimal 
prices and lot sizes, and the expected profits We do the analysis for each channel choice 
and compare them with respect to changes in the optimal values under different 
conditions 
To extend the research in this thesis, non-linear core supply functions can be assumed 
although they add to the complexity of the models significantly In modeling the core 
collection yield rate, we considered the cases in which that the yield rate was independent 
of the acquisition price This can be changed in a future research to include cases in 
which the acquisition price affects the yield rate In addition, different probability 
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distribution functions can be used to model the stochastic yield rate and their impact of 
the optimal solutions can be analyzed Furthermore, multi-period and infinite horizon 
joint pricing and inventory management models can be considered in the future research 
to investigate the impact of the optimal decisions made in each period on the future 
periods One of the research streams that can also be considered as the extension of the 
current thesis is the one that includes the decisions related to the initial product design 
and its impact on the optimal recovery policies (1 e including the optimal prices and lot 
sizes as well as the optimal recovery options available to the firm and the third party 
competitors) that a firm could plan for ahead of the time Depending on the type of 
products, different researches can be conducted to help the OEM make more sustainable 
decisions from the very beginning when she designs the new products 
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Appendix A: Derivation of Inverse Demand Functions 
To come up with the inverse demand functions (1 e expressions 1 and 2 in the first 
paper or 23 and 24 in the second paper), first we assume a more general case in which the 
market size is equal to M and the consumers' willingness-to-pay is heterogeneous and 
uniformly distributed in the interval (p e [0,#>] (where cp < oo) with the cumulative 
distribution function F() As a result, F(<p) = <p/<p, for <p e [0,^] Based on the 
consumers' preferences, we can divide them into three groups first, the consumers who 
prefer to buy the new product, the consumers who prefer to buy the remanufactured 
product, and third, the consumers who prefer not to buy any of the products We assume 
that the consumer who is indifferent between buying the new and remanufactured 
products, has a willingness-to-pay of <px For this consumer, the utility that he gains from 
buying a unit of the new product is equal to the utility from buying a unit of the 
remanufactured product In addition, the consumer who is indifferent between buying a 
remanufactured product and not buying anything, has a willingness-to-pay of <p2 Again, 
the utility of this consumer from buying a unit of the remanufactured product is equal to 
the utility that he will have from not buying anything, that is zero It is evident that 
q>2 < (p{ <<p We find the prices for new (Pn) and remanufactured (Pr) products based 
on <px and <p2 by solving the indifference conditions The conditions are as follows 
ar<p2-Pr=0 (A2) 
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an and ar show the quality perception of the consumers towards new and remanufactured 
products respectively In our models, we have an = 1 and ar = 5, 5 e (0,1), which 
shows that if the consumer's willingness-to-pay for the new product is (px, his willingness 
to pay for the remanufactured product will be 8q>x In the more general terms, if the 
consumer's willingness-to-pay for the new product is anq>x, his willingness-to-pay for the 
remanufactured product will be ar<px In condition (Al), the left side of the equation 
shows the utility of the consumer type 1 (who is indifferent between buying a unit of the 
new product and buying a unit of the remanufactured product) from buying a unit of the 
new product, and the right side represents the consumer's utility from buying a unit of the 
remanufactured product In condition (A2), the left side of the equation shows the utility 
that the consumer type 2 (who is indifferent between buying a remanufactured product 
and not buying anything) gains from buying a unit of the remanufactured product, and the 
right side is his utility from not buying anything, which is equal to zero 
From condition (A2) we have 
Pr = ocr(p2 (A3) 
We substitute Pr in condition (Al), and we will have 
an(Px-P„ = arg>x-ar<p2 => 
^ , = ( a n - a r t o + a r p 2 (A4) 
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Now we find the relationship between the quantities (demands) for new (qn) and 
remanufactured (qr) products and <px and cp2 Assuming the market size of Mand the 
cumulative distribution function F() for tp (q> ~ U[0, (p\) as explained earlier, we have 
qn=M[l-F(q>l)] = Mrty-<pl) 
M 
qr = M[F(<px) - F(jp2)] = ^ (<p, - (p2) 
<P 
Solving for (px and cp2 in terms of quantities, we will have 
-n 1 , (A5) 
M 
M 
(A6) 
Now, as we assumed in this research, if an = 1, ar = S, where £ e (0,1), by 
substituting these values and <p{ and cp2 from (A5) and (A6) in expressions (A3) and 
(A4) we will have 
Pr=8cp2=8^-(M-qn-qr) (A7) 
M 
Pn=(l-S)<p]+S<p2=^-(M-qn-Sqr) (A8) 
M 
Equations (A7) and (A8) give values of Pr and Pn in a general format, that is, they 
depend on the total market size M and the maximum possible willingness to pay by any 
consumer, cp As a result, they do not have to be less than 1 in this general format 
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However, in this research, where we have <p = l and the market size is normalized to 1 
(1 e M = 1), we will have 
?>, =!-<?„ (A9) 
P 2 =l -<?„-<? , (A10) 
And from equations (A7) and (A8), we will have 
Pn=i-q„-*ir ( A n ) 
Pr=5{\-qn-qr) (A12) 
Expressions (Al l ) and (A 12) are the inverse demand functions that we use in this 
research and are consistent with the ones in Ferguson and Toktay (2006) 
Now if somebody wants to find the general values of the prices for new (P G ) and 
remanufactured (P G ) products from the values in (Al l ) and (A 12), here are the required 
calculations 
From (Al l ) qn+Sqr=\-Pn 
From(A12) qn+qr=\-?f 
o 
From (A7) we have PrG=S — (M-q - # ) = > 
M 
w P (A13) 
M 8 
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And from (A8) we have p° =^-(M-qn-Sq„)=> 
r 0 ( A 1 4 ) 
PnG={-(M-\ + PJ M 
Equations (A 13) and (A 14) give the general price values for the remanufactured and 
new products respectively, knowing the ones that we find in this research (I e Pr and 
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Appendix B. Analys is of the cases for K K T condit ions 
Case 1 _qn > 0, qr > 0 , fin = 0 and fir = 0 
qflL >0^S(Cn+h)>B (51) 
qm.Mc >Q=>s(\-8) + 8(Cn + h)-(2-S)B>0=>S(Cn +h) > (2-S)B-5(\-8) => 
=>S(Cn+h)> B + (\-S)(B-S) (52) 
^ , B (l-S)(B-S) 
=> C „+ /z > — + -
S 5 
n 
If B > 8 => in (4) => Cn + h > — > 1, but Cn + h cannot be larger than 1 
5 
=>B<S^(\-S)(B-S)<0 
q\D > 0 => 5{ 1 - S ) + 8{Cn + h)-(2-S)B>0=> S(Cn + h) > ( 2 - 5 ) B - S ( 1 - 8 ) => 
=>d(Cn+h)> B + {\-5)(B-S) (53) 
If (Bl) holds, (B2) and (B3) will hold because the right side of (Bl) is the largest of 
the three So, we choose (Bl) as the condition to be in place 
qlmLMc >0^Cn+h<B + (l-S) (54) 
qMRc > o = > 2 ( l - J ) - ( 2 - < y ) ( C B + h) + B>0=>(2-S)(Cn+h)<B + 2(l-S) (55) 
qcnD >0=>2(l-S)-(2-S)(C„ +/z) + 5 > 0 = > ( 2 - £ ) ( C „ + h)<B + 2(l-S) (56) 
(54) => (2-5)(C„+h)<(2-5)B + (2-5)(\-S) 
(55) => (2-8){Cn + h)<B + 2(\-S) 
(56) => (2-6)(Cn+h)<B + 2(\-5) 
(B5) and (B6) are equivalent If (B4) holds, (B6) will hold, because (B4) has a smaller 
value in its right side of the inequation, which makes it a tighter condition 
(2-S)B + (2-S)(\-S)-B-2(1-S) = (\-S)B-S(l-S) = (I-S)(B-S) <0 
So, we choose (B4) from these three conditions to be in place 
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As a result, we have two conditions that must hold in order for all values to be positive 
(1 e feasible) These two conditions are (Bl) and (B4) from above 
S(Cn+h)>B 
and 
Cn+h<B + (l-S) 
Case 2 qn > 0, qr = 0 , /un = 0 and jur > 0 
2(\~S)(A-S) " 
=>(2-S)(Cn+h)<B + 2(l-S)-/.ir (B7) 
.(-D 
Mr 
S{\ -5) + S(Cn +h)-{2-S)B + (2-S)/.ir 
25(\-S)(4-S) 
_-S(l-S)-5(Cn+h) + (2-S)B 
2-5 
0 
Mr >0^-S(l-S)-S(Cn +h) + (2-S)B>0=>S(Cn +h) < (2-S)B- S(\- 5) 
(B8) 
Substituting /ur in (B7) we have 
( 2 - 5 ) 2 (C„ + h) < ( 2 - 5 ) B + 2(2-5){\ - S ) + S(\-8) + S(Cn + h)-(2-5)B => 
(4-5S + S2)(Cn+h)<(4-S)(\-S)=> 
^Cn+h<l 
This is true all the time since the unit cost of manufacturing has to be less than 1 when 
we are dealing with normalized prices 
I 4(1 — o) 
^(2-S)(Cn+h)<B + 2(\-S)-Mr (B9) 
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g r = S(CH+h)-B + Mr 
*' 48(1-8) r " 
8(Cn+h)<B (BIO) 
Substituting jur in (B9) we have 
=>(2-8)(C„ +h)<B + 2(l-S)-B + S(Cn +h) => 2(l-8)(Cn + h)<2(\-8) 
=> Cn + h < 1 which is always true 
,^Mc =l_C„+h-B-Mr >Q^ _ ^ 
4 4(1 -8) " r 
=>(Cn+h)<B + (l-8)-Mr (Bl l ) 
mLuc 1 ^ 8(Cn+h)-(2-8)B + (2-5)Mr Q_ 
4 4S(\-S) 
=>8(\-8) + 8(Cn +h)-(2-S)B + (2-S)Mr = 0 ^ 
^
 t = -8(\-S)-5(Cn+h) + (2-S)B ^Q_ 
Ml
 2-5 
S(Cn+h)<(2-S)B-S(\-S) (B12) 
Substituting fir in (Bl 1) we have 
=> (2 - S)(C„ + h) < (2 - 8 ) B + (1 -8){2 - 8) + 8(\ - 8) + 8(Cn + h) -(2 - 8)B => 
^2(\-8)(Cn +h) <2(l-8)^ 
=> Cn +h < 1 which is always true 
In summary we have 
From (B8) and (B12) 8(Cn +h)< (2 - 8)B - 8(\ - 8) 
From (BIO) 8(Cn +h)<B 
Case 3 qn=0,qr>0,jun>0 and /ur = 0 
co S(l-8) + 8(Cn+h)-(2-8)B-8Mn ? Q 
25(l-8)(4-8) 
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8(Cn+h)>(2-8)B-8(l-8) + 8jUn (B13) 
CD ^2(\-8)-(2-8)(Cn+h) + B + (2-8)M„ = Q 
2(l-8)(4-8) 
I — o 
(B14) 
Substituting jun in (B13) we have 
5(2-8)(Cn + h)>(2-8)2B-8(l-8)(2-S) + 5(2-8)(C„ + h)-8B-2S(\-8) •. 
^(4-58 + 82)B<8(\- S)(4 -S)=>(1- S){4 -S)B<8(\- 8){4 -S)=> 
=> B < 8 which we have already proved this to be true for (B3) 
= S(Cn+h)-B-SMn +h)>B + SMn (B15) 
r
 48(\-8) " " 
MRC _ 1
 { -(2-8)(Cn+h) + B + (2-8)M„ Q _ 
2 4(1-8) 
2(\-8)-(2- S)(C„ +h) + B + (2- S)/i„ = 0 ^> 
z — o 
Substituting
 /un in (B15) we have 
8(2 - 8)(Cn +h)>(2- 8)B + 8(2 - 8)(Cn + h) - SB - 28(1 - 8) => 2(1 - 8)B < 28(\ - 8) 
B < 5 which is already shown to be true 
qr*
 = i + ^ C - + ^ - ( 2 - ^ - ^ >0^8(l-8) + 8(C + h)-(2-8)B-8Mn>0 
4 48(1-8) 
8(C„+h)>(2-8)B-8(l-8) + 8M„ (B17) 
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.RRLMC 1 Cn+h-B-Vn KKLML
 = J_ n r^ = Q = C „ + h - B - (1 - 8) > 0 => 
Hn
 4 4(l-<?) M" 
Cn+h>B + {\-8) (B18) 
Substituting //„ in (B17) we have 
^8(Cn + h)>(2-8)B-8(\-8) + 8(C„ + h)-8B-8(l-8)=> 
2(l-S)B<2S(\-S)^ 
=> B < 8 which is already shown to be true 
In summary we have 
From (B14) and (B16) (2 - 5){Cn +h)> B+ 2Q.-5) 
From(B18) C„ +h > B + (\-d) 
Considering the conditions from cases 1, 2 and 3, we can create figure 3 2 to show 
how the feasible solution area can be divided into different regions based on the values 
for the unit costs of manufacturing and remanufacturing The following inequalities 
define the different regions 
Inequality 1 5{Cn +h)<{2-S)B-8{\- 8) 
Inequality 2 (2 - 5){Cn + h) > B + 2(1 - 5) 
Inequality 3 5{Cn +h)<B 
Inequality 4 C„ +h > B + (\-S) 
And the regions are define as follows 
Region 1 S(Cn+h)>B and C„+h<B + (l-S) 
Region2 Cn +h > B + (l -8) and (2-S)(Cn + h) < B+ 2(1-S) 
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Region 3 (2 - 8){C„ + h) > B + 2(1 - 8) 
Region 4 8{Cn + h) < B and S(C„ +h)>(2- S)B - 6(1 - 6) 
Region 5 5(Cn + h) < (2 - S)B - S( 1 - 8) 
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Appendix C. Comparison of prices and quantities across structures 
Now, considering conditions 1 and 2 in expressions (3 8) and (3 9), we look at the 
optimal prices across different structures and compare them with each other 
pRRLMC _pMR( _\-8-(C„+h-E) 
4 
From (B4) in Appendix B we know Cn +h- B <\-8 
=>\-8-(Cn+h-B)>0^ PnMRC < PnmcMC 
pco pMRC_2(Cn+h) + 2(l-S) + B C„+h_2(\-8) + B-(2-8)(C„+h) 
2 ( 4 - J ) 2 2(4-8) 
According to (B6) (2-8)(Cn +h)<B + 2(l-S) 
=>2(\-8) + B-(2- 8)(Cn + h) > 0 ^> PnMSC < PnCD 
PCD _ pm:Mc = 2(C„+h) + 2(\-S) + B _ \-5 + C„+h + B = 
2(4-S) 4 
_ 4(Cn + h) + 4(\ -S) + 2B-(4-S)(\-S)-(4-S)(C„ + h)-(4-S)B 
~ 4(4-5) 
_ 5(Cn +h) + S(\-S)-(2-S)B 
~ 4(4 - 5) 
From (B2) in Appendix B we know that 
8(Cn +h)>(2-8)B-S(\-8)=> 8(C„ +h) + 8(\ -8)-(2-8)B>0 
pCD _ pRREMC r\ . pRRLMC
 < pCD 
As a result, we have found that under conditions 1 and 2, the following always holds 
pMRC
 < pRREMC < pCD 
n n n 
Now, we look at the remanufactured product prices across different sructures 
PMRC _plmnMc =28 + 8(Cn+h) + B 8 + B ^8(Cn +h)- B 
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We know that 5(Cn +h)>B^> PrMRC > P™£MC 
PCD_PRRLMC
 =8 | 8(l-8) + 8(Cn+h) + 2B S + B = 
2 2(4-8) 2 
_ 8(\-8) + 8(C„+h) + 2B- (4 -8)B _ 8(\ - 8) - (2 - S)B + 8(Cn + h) 
~~ 2(4-5) ~ 2(4 - 8) 
From (B2) in Appendix B we know that 
8(Cn+h)>(2-8)B-8(l-8)^8(Cn+h) + 8(\-8)-(2-8)B>0 
pCD _ pRREMC r> pRRCMC
 < pCD 
r r r r 
pc»_pMI<c =S | S(\-S) + S(Cn+h) + 2B 28 + S(Cn+h) + B ^ 
2 2(4-8) 4 
_ 28(\ -S) + 28(Cn +h) + 4B- 5(4 - S)(Cn +h)-(4- 8)B _ 
~ 4(4 - 8) ~ 
_ 28(\ -5)- 5(2 - 5)(Cn +h) + 5B _ S[2(\ -5)-(2- 5)(Cn +h) + B] 
~ 4(4 - 5) ~ 4(4-5) 
(56) => (2-8)(C„+h)<B + 2(\-8)^>8[2(l-8)-(2-8)(Cn+h) + B]>0 
_ ^ pCD _ pMRC > 0 _ s pMRC pCD 
To summarize, we are able to show that the following rankings hold between the 
prices for the remanufactured product in different structures 
< pMRC < pi 
In a similar way, we are able to show how the quantities of new and remanufactured 
products across structures compare with each other, as follows 
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rnuuc _ CD
 = l-S-(C„+h) + B 2(\-S)-(2-S)(Cn+h) + B = 
4 ( 1 - J ) 2( l -<y)(4-£) 
_( l - < y)(4-<y)-(4-<?)(C B +/ i ) + (4 - < y)B-4( l - < y) + 2 ( 2 - < ? ) ( C H + / i ) - 2 ^ 
4(1 - ^)(4 - ^) 
_-S(\-S)-S(Cn+h) + (2-S)B 
4(1 - S){4 - 5) 
From (B2) in Appendix B we know that 
S(Cn+h)>(2-S)B-S(\-S)=>-S(\-S)-S(C„+h) + (2-S)B<0 
RRLML „ CD 
=>q„-q„<o=>qrML<<i: 
M«c _ RKLMC = 1 , B-(2-S)(C„+h) 1 | (C„+h)-B 
2 4 (1 -£ ) 4 4 ( 1 - £ ) 
( l - ^ ) + 5 - ( 2 - J ) ( C n +h) + (Cn +h)-B 
4 ( 1 - J ) 
( i - < y ) - ( i - < y ) ( c „ + / i ) = i - ( c „ + / i ) 
4(i-<y) 4 > 0 => tf™ < q^
RC 
UBL_ CD=2(\~S) + B-(2-S)(C„+h) 2(\-S)-(2-S)(C„+h) + B = 
q
"
 q
" 4(1 -5) 2(\-8)(4-5) 
_ 2(1 -S) (A-5 ) + B{4-5)-{2-5){4-S){Cn +h)-4(1 - S ) + 2(2-S)(CB +h)-2B 
~ 4{\-S)(4-S) 
_ 2(1 - 5 ) ( 2 - S ) + B{2-5)-{2-5){2-S)(C„ + h) _ 
4{\-8){4-8) 
= (2 - 5)[2{\ -5) + B-{2- 5){Cn + h)] 
4(l-S)(4-S) 
From (B6) in Appendix B we know that (2 - S)(Cn +h)<B + 2(\-S) 
CD „ „MRC 2(l-g) + B-(2-S)(C„+h)>0=*q™L - q L „ u > 0 => </„-'J <q"n 
We can summarize the comparisons above as follows 
RREMC
 < CD < nMRC 
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Finally, we look at the optimal quantities for the remanufactured product across 
structures Considering the optimal values in table 2, we have 
CD
 ltRIMC =8(\-8) + 8(Cn+h)-(2-8)B 1 8{Cn+h)-{2-8)B = 
q
'
 r
 28(\-8)(4-8) 4 48(\-8) 
_28(\-8) + 28(C„ + h)-2(2-8)B-8(\-S)(4-8)-8(4-8)(Cn + h) + (2 -8) (4 -5 )B _ 
48(\-S)(4-S) 
_-S(\- S)(2 -S)~ 8(2 - 8)(C„ + h) + (2 - 8f B _ (2 - 8)[-8(l -8)- S(Cn + h) + (2- 5)B] 
~ 48(\-8)(4-8) ~ 48(\~8)(4-8) 
From (B2) we know that 
8(Cn + h) > (2 - S)B - 8(1 - 8) => -5(1 - 8) - 8(C„ + h) + (2 - 8)B < 0 
CD „ltltlMC „ n _ ^ „C/5 . „RRLMC 
qLru-qr <0^Vr <1r 
CD_ MRC ^8(\-8) + 8(C„+h)-(2-8)B 8(C„+h)-B
 = 
9 r
 ' 2£( l -£ ) (4-<?) 4 £ ( l - £ ) 
_ 2<?(1 - 8) + 2<?(C„ + h) - 2(2 - <?)£ - 8(4 - <?)(C„ + h) + (4 - <?)£ _ 
48(\-8)(4-8) 
_ 28(1-8)-8(2- S)(Cn + h) + <SB _ 2( 1 - 8) - (2 - 8)(Cn +h) + B 
~~ 48(\-8)(4-8) ~ 4(\-8)(4-8) 
According to (B6) (2 - S)(Cn +h)<B + 2(\-8) 
=>2(\-8) + B-(2- 8)(C„ +h)>0^ qcrD - q"RC > 0 => qfic < qcrD 
Finally, we can summarize the comparisons above as the following 
MRC
 < CD < RREMC 
Hr Hr ^r 
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Appendix D. Concavity test for the firm's expected profit in the 
Centralized Channel when the constraint is non-binding 
To check for the concavity of the firm's expected profit function, we need to calculate 
the Hessian matrix First and second derivatives of the firm's expected profit with respect 
to Pn, Pr, Pa, zn and zr are as follows 
dE(U) 
dz„ 
= -(cn+hn) + (Pn+s„+hn)[l-F„(zn)] (Dl) 
d2E{U) 
dzl 
= -(Pn+sn+hn)fn(zn) (D2) 
dE(U) 
dz. 
= -{cr +hr +v) + (Pr +sr +hr)[l-Fr(zr)] (D3) 
d2E(U) 
dzj = -(Pr+sr+hr)fr(zr) (D4) 
dE(Tl) 
dP„ 
M 
cM ^
 f A (P-cr)M vM 
W-S) q>(\-5) p ( l - t f ) 
d2E(U) _ -2M 
dPl ~ p ( l - £ ) (D6) 
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8E(U)
 = (Pn-cJM 
dPr ?(\-8) 
+ M K-2Pr + ^ ^ + / , - e < 0 + vM 
y8(\-S) yS(\-S) 
(D7) 
d2E(U) -2M 
8P2 pS(\-5) 
(D8) 
8E(U) 
8P„ 
= Pv-a-pc,-2(3Pa (D9) 
d2E(Yl) 
dP,2 
-IP (D10) 
If we define g() = E(Yl), we have 
82E(TI) ,n , w , x d2E(Yl) ft 5 2 £ ( n ) 
dzi 8zdz„ 8z8P„ 
d2E(Tl) d2E(Yl) 82E(U) 
gH
 8z8Pr ' * 1 5 8z8P„ ' *2 ' 8z8z„ 
d2E{U)
 fn . . . . , a
2£(n)
 n a
2£(n) , 
# 2 2 = — ^ i H ^ + J , + * , ) / , ( ^ ) . g 2 3 = „ ^ = o , g24 = „ _ =l-F,(Zr), 8z< dz.dP. dzr8Pr 
82E(Tl) 82E(U) 82E(U) 
#25 = -, ^ = 0 ' #3! = „ „ „ = l - ^ ( 0 > #32 = . „ - = 0 > &,a>fl ^ B & B SP.cfe. 
_ 5 2 £ ( n M ) _ -2M _ 82E(U) = 2M = d2E(Yl) 
#33 - , n 2 ~ - / , ^ ' ^34 a D a D - — / 1 ^ ' #35 ^ ^p 
sp; w-5) 8Pn8Pr q>(\-S) 
d2E(U)
 n a
2£(n) s2£(n) 2M 
3^z„ ^ , & , dPrdP„ (f>(\-5) 
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82E(U) -2M d2E(TI)
 n d2E{U) A d2E(Yl) . 
g44 = „„2 ==77*—^' 6*45 = *„*„ = °> gu =-^T^— = °> S52 = =°> dPf y8{\-5) dRdP dP„dz„ dPadzr 
. 5 3 = ^ = 0 , ^ ^ = 0 , ^ ^ - 2 / ? 
dPdP. dPadPr dP 
The Hessian matrix is defined as follows H = 
6*11 6*12 6*13 6*14 6*15 
6*21 6*22 6*23 6*24 6*25 
6*31 6*32 6*33 6*34 6*35 
6*41 6*42 6*43 6*44 6*45 
.6*51 6*52 6*53 6*54 6*55 
|^ .| = g.,=-(^+^+^)/»(O<01 
\H2 = 
6*1. 6*12 
6*21 6*22 
= (i>„ +*„ + f c J / B ( 0 (P, +5r +/«,)/, (z,) >0 
^ 3 = 
6*11 6*12 6*13 
6*21 6*22 6*23 
6*31 6*32 6*33 
—
 6*11 V&22 6*33 6*236*32/ ^ "*" 6*13 V6*216*32 6*226*31/ — 
2M 
= <P„+sH+hll)f„(zn) 
+ [\-Fn(zn)][0 + (Pr+sr+hr)fr(zr)[\-Fn(z„)]] 
{Pr+sr+hr)Mzr)—-—-0 
<p(l-5) 
= (Pr+sr+hr)fr(zr) [\-Fn(zn)f-(P„+sn+hJ 2M 7p{\-d) f.M 
Since [l-F„(zn)f <1 and (PH +sn+h„) 2M 
9Q-S) 
f„(zn) > 1 in our analysis, this 
principal minor is negative Thus, \H3\ < 0 
\H. 
Sw §\i Sn §\A 
%2\ §22 £*23 S24 
&3\ S32 S33 &34 
§4] &42 &43 844 
-{P„+s„+K)f„{z„) 
0 
1-F„(Z„) 
0 
0 \ - F M 0 
•(Pr+sr+hr)fr(zr) 0 \-Fr(zr) 
0 -2M 2M 
l~Fr(zr) 
2M -2M 
p (1 - S) =<?(! - 8) 
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W4\ = -(P„+sn+hn)fn(zn) 
<Pr+sr+K)fr(zr)[ AM' AM' 
p2S(}-5)2 p2{\-5) -] + 
U~Fr(zr)]2- 2M 
<p(\-8) 
•V-F.MV 
2M (Pr +sr +hr)fr(zr)——--[\-Fr(zr)] yd(\-5) 
= (Pn+Sn+hn)fn(z„) (Pr+sr+K)fr(zr)~ i^!__[1_J,(Zr)]l_^L." 
-V-F„(z„)f (Pr+sr+hr)fr(zr)- 2M (pd{\-S) 
•[l-Fr(zr)f 
\H,\ = (Pr+sr+hr)fr(zr) 2M (p5 (P„+s„+hJfn(z„) 
2M 
<p(l-5) ~V-Fn(z„)]
2 
\-5 
-U-Fr(zr)f (P„+stt+hn)f„(z„)- 2M q>(\-S) • [ i - ^ C O l
2 
It can be shown numerically that for the parameters used in our analysis |//4| > 0 In 
addition, we have \HS | = \H41 X (-2/9) Since |i/41 > 0, we will have \H51 < 0 As a result, 
the Hessian matrix is negative semidefinite and the expected profit function is strictly 
concave 
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Appendix E. Proof for Theorem 1 
ig^-P-ffi>g[c,; + ft)_gy;+ft)+2e.(,.) + »>(x,)] dz„ 
-(cn+h„)F„(zn) + (P„°-c„+2sn) [ 1 - ^ ( ^ ) 1 
Where y° = M p° _ p° and y°r = M 
we will need to find the zeros of R{zn) 
SPn°-P? If we assume R{zn) = 5ER{U) 3z„ : 
dRjzJ
 = d 
5z„ <3z 
dER(Yl) 
dz. 
+ [ 1 - ^ ^ ) 1 
(~pbl +M„)-S(y°r +Mf) + 2®„(zH) + g&r(zr)\-^(Pn0 +c„ +2h„ +2sn) 
M 
52JR(z„)_a/„(z„) 
dz„ (~)bl + A) - ^  + ^ )
+ 2©» (*») + **r (*,)]" ^ (^° + *„ + 2A„ + 2.,,) 
•3/„(z„)[l-F„(z„)] 
M 
a2*(z„) ^ ( z . ) 1 
5z 3z /" (z ) 5z„ M - 3 / „ ( z J [ l - F „ ( z J ] ^ : 
5z„ dz] dzn fn(zn) M J"KnR "K"nM 
— _ - y \ - t n ( z n ) \ — 
dzi M 
y . ( ^ ) [ l - F , ( z . ) ] 
+ 3/„(z„) 
Defining r{) = / ( ) 
1-FQ 
Petruzzi and Dada, 1999), we will have 
which is known as the hazard rate (Barlow and Proschan, 1975, 
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^ ~ H - F . ( * . ) ] £ 
dzi M 
We find that at the point where — = 0 , the value of ~- is independent of zr 
In addition, we have R(Bn) = -(c„ + hn) < 0 
&„ dz 
I) if J"^ *> > - 3 / f l ( z J r ( z J , then — - ^ L < 0 which indicates that R(zn) is either 
monotone or unimodal, and it has at most two roots In addition, R(Bn) = -(c„ + hn) < 0 
Thus, if /?(zn) has only one root, it shows a change of sign from positive to negative, 
which corresponds to a local maximum of ER(Tl) If R(zn) has two roots, the larger of 
the two corresponds to a local maximum and the smaller of the two corresponds to a local 
minimum Either way, ER(Tl) has only one local maximum which is determined either 
as the unique value of zn that satisfies R(zn)=— = 0 or as the larger of two 
values of z„ that satisfy R(zn) = — ^ — - = 0 
dz„ 
oz_ dzi 
II) If J"^ "' <-3fn(zJr(zJ, then ^\"J > 0 Since R(Bn)<0, it means that 
R(zn) has to change sign from positive to negative when zn increases up to Bn Note 
that this needs a sufficient condition such as R(An) > 0 Thus, the only possibility of this 
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happening is if R(zn) has only one root which corresponds to a local maximum for 
EK(U) 
£\ 771 /"TT\ 
In either I or II, we can claim that the largest value of zn that satisfies — = 0 
(which in the case of having one root for R(zn) is the only point) should be chosen as 
Now, we calculate the derivatives of ER (IT) with respect to zr 
^
5
^ = [\-Fr(zr)]^-[(y:+Mn)Hy>Mr)-®n(0-&r(zr)} 
ozr 1M 
(cr +hr +v)Fr(zr) + ~(P^ -cr+2sr -v)[l-Fr(z,)] 
II we assume L(zr) = — , we have 
dz. 
ozr dzr 2M 
+ ^-Fr^r)f~7-(cr+K+v)fr(zr)-^fr(zr)(Pr-cr+2sr-v) 
2M 2 
dL{zr) 
dz. = ~fr(*r) ~hl +M„) + (y°r +Mr)-®n(Zn)-®r(z,)]+fa0 +'r + * + * r +^K) 
+ [1"^(2,)]2 2M 
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dL\zr) dfr{zr) 
dz. 
Sep 
^l(y:+MJ + (y>Mr)-®n(zn)-®r(zr)]+~(Pr°+cr+v + 2sr+2hr) 
Sip 
^U^-Fr(zr)}-2Mzril-FM)}f^ = 2M 2M 
VM 
dz. 
5<p 
2M 
[(y:+M„) + (y0r+Mr)-®„(Zn)-®r(zr)hkPr°+Cr+v + 2sr+2hr) 
2M 
dL2(zr) dfr(zr) 
dz dz. 
dzr L r rn 2M 5q> 
2M 
/ , (z , ) [ l -F r (z , ) ] 
For — = 0 we have 
dz. 
8L2(zr)_ dfr(zr) 
dzl dz. 
Sip 
2M 
-fM)[l-Fr(zr)] Sep 2M 
dzl l Ar)hM 
dfr(zr) 1 
8zr r(zr) - / , ( * , ) 
tf^O_i_ + / ( ) > 0 ^a^) < 0 
dzr r(zr) dzi 
If 
dz. > - » , ) r{zr) 
5L2(zr) 
dz] <0 
We also have R(Br) = - ( c , +hr+v)<0 
As a result, a similar analysis (to what we had for the new product) is applicable here 
Now, we define the sufficient conditions R(An) > 0 and L{Ar) > 0 that we used in the 
analysis earlier 
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R(AJ =
 ~2M [°,"° +jU")-S{y" + ^ + 2»» -2An+S&r(zr)] + ^ (Pn° - c „ + 2sn) 
We substitute y° = M 1- -
pO _ nO 
H r _ and j/r° = M 
p £ ( l - £ ) 
while we consider 
z. =Ar 
<P 
^ K ) = -TT7 (M 2M 
p° _ p° XP° _ P° 
1 n r n r_ + M„ ~ fyr) + 2/"„ - 2 4 + 8nr - 8Ar 
M 
0 o „o 
1 - + 3 i " „ - 2 ^ - & I r 
We know thatpo
 = f i L ± g . t > , + f r , f r a n d po = cr + v + ^ + ( / ,„ + Mr)^ ^ 
2 2M 2 2M 
substitute the values for P° and P° in the equation above and find the relationship 
among the model parameters that need to be in place so that R(An) > 0 So, we have 
R(A) = <p 2M M 1 -
<\ + S)P*-2P? 
+ 3M„-2An-SAr + -(P°-c„+2s„)>0 
^R(AJ = ^ -(4Mn-2An-SAr) + —^-[&n-cr-v + 2(\-S)sn]>0 
1M 2(1 — o) 
9
 (4Mn-2A„-SAr) + -zJ-^cn+Sn>T:^z(cr+v) 2M 2(1 -8) 2(1 -5) 
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L(Ar) = 
8q> 
2M 
(M\ 
P° _ p° 
n r 
+ M„) + (M SP„°-Pr
0
' 
lp8{\ - S) + Mr)-M„+A„-Mr+
A
r 
1 
2 
Sep 
2M 
(Pr°-cr-v + 2sr)--
M 
P° 
(pS + A+A n • "r 
Sep Sep 1 
+ A ( P ; -Cr -v + 2 , r ) ^ + ^ k +A,] + ^-cr -v + 2sr) 
5q> 5cp 1 L(Ar) = f + ^[An+Ar] + ^-cr-V + 2sr)>0 
-^-[M + An + Ar] + sr >-(cr +v) 2M J 2 
Sufficient conditions for i?OJ and L(zr) to have at least one root, are R(AJ > 0 
and I(^4r) >0 respectively Thus, we need to have 
V ( 4 / / B - 2 ^ - 5 4 r ) + ^ - T 7 c f l + J / , > ^ - T r ( c r + v ) 
2M 2 ( 1 - J ) 2 ( 1 - J ) 
<5<p 1 
0 w - [ M + ^ + ^ ] + J r ^ ^ ( C r + V ) 
2M 2 
131 
Appendix F. Concavity test for the firm's expected profit in the 
Centralized Channel when constraint is binding 
To check for the concavity of the firm's expected profit function, we need to calculate 
the Hessian matrix First and second derivatives of the firm's expected profit with respect 
to Pn, Pr, zn and zr are as follows 
8E(UM) 
dz„ 
= -(c„+h„) + (Pn+sn+hn)[l-Fn(zn)] (Fl) 
82E(UM) 
dzl 
<Pn+sn+hn)f„{zn) (F2) 
dER(Yl) 
dz„ 
-(cr +hr)Fr(zr) + (Pr +sr -cr)[l-Fr(zr)] 
2M 
r
2p 
SP-P n r 
p5(\-S) — zr+(-)(v-c, + — ) - v rzj3 r r P 
(F3) 
d2ER(U) 
dzl 
= -{Pr+sr+hr)fr{zr)-
r
2p 
(F4) 
dEK(Yl) _ M I 
3P„ lp{\-5) 
+ M„ -©„(-„) 
\, a\ 
<p{\-8)-2Pn + 2Pr +c„ -c, +-(y-c, +-)-v—T-
r P r• p 
M 
8Pn-Pr 
(F5) 
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82ER(Yl) -2M 1 + M 
dP2 p(\-S)[ r2p\jp{\-8) 
dER(U) _ M 
dPr pS(\-S) 
+ pr-®r(zr) 
2SP„ -2Pr -&„ +cr --{v-c, +^)+v + ^L 
r p r p 
\SPn-Pr ' 
_y5(\-S)_ 
+ 2 H 
82ER(U) = -M \ 
+ -
2M 
dp; pS(l-8)\ rlp 
1 
yS{\-8)_ 
If we define g() = E(Y1M), we have 
g. 
^(n.). mL),,,, 
5z dz & 
513 , , n * 1n\^nJ' 614 - a n 
d2E(uM)_ d2E(nM) 
—
 U
 ' 621 — - - - U ' 
g 22 
d2E(YlM) 
dz2 
= -(Pr+sr+hr)fr(zr) — , g23 = 
r p 
2M d2E(TlM) 
8zrdPn r2pcp{\-S) 
824 ~ 
d2E(UM) 2M 
dzr8Pr r2p^S{\-5) + 1 - ^ ( 0 , 6 ^ = ^ ^ = 1 - ^ ) , dP„dz„ 
6-32 = 
d2E(UM) = 2M 
dPn8zr r2py(\-8) 6-33 = 
82E(nM)_ -2M | 1 + M 
OP: p ( l - £ ) l r2f37p{\-5) 
6-3 
d2E(YlM) 2M 
dPn8Pr y(\-S) 
1 + -
M 
r
2pp8(l-8) <?41
 —
 ' 
d2E(nM) 
dPrdzn 
= 0, 
d2E(UM) 
^42= ^ . _ M / = 1 - ^ ( ^ ) + . 2 Q -
2M 
dP.dz, rlpp8(\-8) 
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<§43 ~ 
d2E(UM) 2M 
dPrdPn VQ-S) 
1 + - M 
r
z/3^S{\-5) 
_ d2E(JJM) -M 
6 44 ~ - ~ - - * Z "*" 
2M 
a/y ^ ( i - <y> I r lp [ p <?(i - J ) 
The Hessian matrix is defined as follows H = 
|^1 | = g 1 1=-( /> w+*„+A I I ) / n (z„)<0, 
6*11 £\2 6*13 8\4 
§2{ §22 823 §24 
83,1 832 833 834 
.6*41 842 843 844. 
H2 = 
N 
8i\ 812 
#2. 822 
= (PK+s„+hn)fn(z„) [(Pr+Sr+hr)fr(zr) + —]>0 1_ 
r
2j3J 
8w 812 8\3 
§2\ 822 823 
§3\ 832 833 
8UK822833 823832) " ~*~ 8\3 \821832 822831) 
= -(P„+s„+hJfn(z„) 
+ V-FK(zB)] 
[{Pr +*r + A , ) / , ( O + 4 d = ^ " 0 + M 
r
2p y(\-8)\ r2pip{\-8)\ r2p<p(\-8) -i-^^r 
0 + [(Pr +sr+hr )fr (zr) + — ] [ 1 - F„ (z„)] _2_ 
r2pJ 
= -(Pn+Sn+h„)fn{zn) (Pr +sr+hr)fr(zr)— ^1 + • + -
AM 
y(\-S){ rzpy(\-8)\ r'Pyil-S) 
+ [\-F„(z„)Y {Pr+sr+hr)fr{zr) + 
r
2p 
= -(Pr+sr+ hr )fr (z, ) \ (Pn +sn+h„ )f„ (zn) 
\M 
2M 
1 + -
M 
-(P„+s„+hn)fn(zn) 
r
2Pp(\-S) + [l-FH(z„)] 
p(l-8)[ r2py(\-5) 
2 
-[\-F„(z„)]2 
r
2p 
<0 
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\H3\<0 
\H. 
8\\ &\i Sn 8\4 
Si\ 822 823 824 
8M 812 833 834 
641 842 843 844 
0 
0 
-iPr+sr+hr)fr{zr)--— 
r P 
2M 
r
2/5(p{\-S) 
2M 
2M 
-2M f, M 
1+-
0 
2M 
r2Pf5(\-8) +l-Fr(zr) 
p(\-S) I r2f5(p(\-8)\ W-3) 
2M 1+- _M 
r
2pip8(\-8) 
r
2/3(p8(\-8) +l~K(zr) 
2M 
<p{\S) 1+-
M 
r
2f$p8(\-8) 
-2M J M 
q>8{\-8) [ r2/3p8(\-8)\ 
\HA\=-iPn+sn+hn)fszny 
(Pr+sr+hr)fr(zr) + — 
r p 
_2M_ 
1 + - M 
r
2PyS(}-5) < r . > 
1 
Vp~ 
2M 
l+-
M 
r
2pip8(\-8) [1-^(^)1 
2M 
r
2/3y5{\-S) + 1 -^(2 , ) 
2M 
p(l-<5) 
2M 
M 
p(\-S){ r2fJy(\-8) 
+ 1 + -
M 
r
2Py5 
•FM 
-D-^(z„)] : 2M 
p£(l-<5) 1 + -
M 
r
2pyd(\-8) 
(Pr+sr+hr)fr(zr) + AM 
r
2pp8(\-5) Fr(zr)-[\-Fr(zr)Y 
It can be shown numerically that for the parameters used in our study \HA | > 0 and as 
a result the Hessian matrix is negative semidefinite Thus, the firm's expected profit in 
the Centralized Channel is strictly concave when the constraint is binding 
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Appendix G. Concavity test for the firm's expected profit in the 
Decentralized Channel 
To check for the concavity of the firm's expected profit function, we need to calculate 
the Hessian matrix First and second derivatives of the firm's expected profit with respect 
to Pn, Pr, zn and zr are as follows 
5z„ 
= -(cn+h„) + (P„+sn+h„)[l-Fn(zn)] (Gl) 
d2E(UM) 
dzl = -(P„+sn+hn)fn(zn) (G2) 
dE(YlM) 
dz„ 
•.-(cr+w + hr) + (Pr+sr+hr)[l-Fr(zr)] (G3) 
d2E(TlM) 
dzl 
= -(Pr+sr+hr)fr(zr) (G4) 
dE(TlM) 
dP„ 
= M 1- 2Pn~Pr 
<j>{\-8) 
cnM (Pr-cr-w)M 
<p{\-8) Jp{\-8) (G5) 
d2E(UM) -2M 
8P; <p(l-S) (G6) 
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dE(JlM) _{Pn-c„)M 
dPr y{\-8) 
+ M K~2Pr 
pS(l-S) 
(cr+w)M 
+ — — + ur - ® ( z , ) (G7) 
d2E(XlM) -2M 
dp; yS{\-8) (G8) 
If we define g ( ) = E(JlM), we have 
£, 
82E(UM) 
dzl = -iPn+S„+h„)fn{z„), g,2 = 
d2E(UM) 
dzdz. 
-0, 
g\. 
d2E(UM) 
&„dP„ =
 l
-
F
n(Zn)> S» = 
d2E(nM) 
dzdP = o, g21 = 
d2E(nM) 
dzdz„ 
822 
d2E(TlM) 
dzl 
= -(Pr+sr+hr)fr(zr), g23 = d
2E(Ylu) 
dz.dP. 
0, 
824 ~' 
d2E(UM) 
dz.dP. 
= l-Fr(zr), g3I = d
2E(UM) 
SP„dz„ 
1 - ^ , 0 J > 6*3 
d2E(TlM) 
dP.dz. 
= 0, 
M,_ ~~ „ _„^„,_ - „ „ _5 2 ^ (n M ) = 0 _ a2£(n ) -2M a2£(nM) 2M 
6*33 — ^02 — —/1 c-\ ' ^ 3 4 — ^r, ^r, — — , , ^ ' 6*41 
ap; ? ( i - £ ) ' ap„5Pr y(\-8) dP.dz. 
or'GZ. 
a 2 £(n w )_ 2M „ _5 2 £(n w ) •2M 
dPr8Pn <p(\-5) §44
 —
 " ' 6 4  dp; yS(\-s) 
The Hessian matrix is defined as follows H 
8w 8n 8\3 8u 
8i\ 822 823 824 
8i[ 832 833 834 
8<t\ 842 843 844. 
M = gu=-(P„+sn+hJf„(z„)<0, 
\H2\ = 
g\\ g\2 
82\ 822 
= (Pn +*„+ KVM (Pr + *r + K)fr^r) > 0 
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^ 3 = 
S\\ §\2 S\3 
&2\ S22 S23 
&3\ §32 <?33 
^11 (^22^33 - ^23^32 ) ~ 0 + ^13 (^2.^32 - ^22^31 ) = 
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S.nce [\-Fn(zjf <1 and {P„ +sn +hn) 2M 
cp{\-8) f„(zn) > 1 in our analysis, this 
principal minor is negative Thus, \H3\ < 0 
m = 
811 
82, 
ft, 
§41 
8n 
822 
8,2 
8n 
813 
823 
833 
843 
8\4 
824 
834 
£44 
= 
~(P„ + s„+hn)fM 
0 
1 - ^ ( 2 . ) 
0 
0 l-^„(z„) 0 
-(.P,+sr+K)fr(z,) 0 \-Fr{zr) 
0 -2M 2M 
l - ^ O O 
qi{\-5) p(l-<5) 
2M -2M 
p(l-S) pSQ-S) 
\Ht\ = -iPn+s„+hn)f„(zn) 
-(Pr+^r+hr)fr(zr)[- 4M
2 4M2 
y'8(\-Sy y\\-S) -] + 
[l-Fr(zr)f- 2M 
p(l-S) 
^P.+S.+KWZ.) 
(Pr + sr +K)fr(zr)_*M ^ -[\-Fr(zr)f 
y8(\-8) 
(Pr+sr+hr)f,(zr) AM
7 
y2S(\-5) •[\-Fr{zr)f-
2 2M 
W-S) 
•P-^UJ]S (Pr+sr+hr)fr(zr)- 2M y8(\-S) •V-Fr{zr)f 
2M \H<\ = (Pr+sr+hr)fr{zr)-
<pS(l-S) 
(P„+s„+K)fAzn)™-[\-F„(zn)f 
V-Fr(zr)f iPn+sn+hn)fn{zn) 2M W-S) -V-Fn(zn)T 
138 
It can be shown numerically that for the parameters used in our analysis |//4 | > 0 As a 
result, the Hessian matrix is negative semidefinite and the expected profit function is 
strictly concave 
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